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7EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study sought to improve the baseline knowledge of the fisheries of Lake Nasser and to make 
recommendations for the improved management of the fisheries, including stock assessment.
The study included the review of key literature, visits to fisheries infrastructure and fishing camps, 
and individual consultations with the key stakeholders by means of semi-structured interviews, as 
well as a collective stakeholder consultation workshop. A preliminary stock assessment was also 
undertaken using the most recent time series of catch and effort estimates.
Since its creation in the 1960s, Lake Nasser has supported important fisheries, mainly for tilapia, 
Nile perch, and species of Alestes and Hydrocynus (tigerfish). Most fishers operate from very basic 
fishing camps situated around the lakeshore or on islands. Tilapia and Nile perch are sold from 
the fishing camps as fresh fish, while the other species are made into a salted fish product called 
muluha.
The Lake Nasser fishery provides direct jobs for 13,000 persons and indirect jobs to an unknown 
number of people. In 2005, the estimated value of the fishery (including both fresh and salted fish) 
was around USD 17 million. 
Access to the fishery is zoned. Four cooperatives and a semi-state fishing and processing company 
(Misr Aswan) control the access to each zone. Licenses to fishers are given based on a supporting 
letter by one of those cooperatives, to be presented to the General Authority for Fishery Resources 
Development (GAFRD) responsible for issuing fishing boat and fisher licenses. However, many 
boats operate without a license due to the limited control capacity of the authority. 
Until recently it was a legal requirement to land all fish through the three official harbors by carrier 
boats owned by the coops and Misr Aswan, allowing the management authority to monitor 
catches from the lake. However, compliance has been low and hence a proportion of landings 
are unreported. This proportion is unknown, but anecdotes suggest it could be significant. More 
landings are now gathered by private sector carrier boats rather than the cooperatives, which 
stopped using theirs. This makes the catch monitoring process inefficient. 
As for processing, the Misr Aswan processing facility operates below capacity as more of the catch 
is purchased by the private sector. Meanwhile, other private sector processors have emerged. 
The current technical measures set to control the harvesting, for example (minimum mesh and 
fish-landing sizes, along with a 1-month closed season corresponding to the main spawning period 
of tilapia), are based on 17-year-old stock assessments.
Compliance with these technical measures has been poor, particularly in the past 4–5 years 
following the transfer of management authority from the High Dam Lake Development Authority 
(HDLDA) to GAFRD due to lack of resources.
In response to growing fishing effort (number of boats) and poor compliance with the technical 
measures, yield from the fishery has declined, with significant interannual variation. Since 1981, 
catch rates have declined by about 80% in a manner symptomatic of unsustainable rates of 
exploitation.
The results of an updated assessment suggest that the maximum yield (about 17,000 metric tons [t]) 
is significantly less than previous estimates and could be caught with just 1300 boats (fMSY)—less 
than half the number now operating.
EXECUTIVE SUM
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Catches from the fishery exceeded YMSY in 13 out of the past 34 years. The stock biomass is 
predicted to be now around 10% of the unexploited biomass B0. This is below the proportion (20%) 
considered necessary to avoid recruitment overfishing.
It is recommended that a management plan be formulated with the full participation of all 
stakeholders with a main priority to rebuild the fish stocks of the lake to sustainable levels, at least 
above 0.2B0. This will require an updated stock assessment and better control rules.
In addition to drafting new legislation, several management measures for the fishery should be 
selected in consultation with key stakeholders to ensure that they can be enforced, including 
control over fishing effort.
Given the lack of incentives for fishers to land their catches through the official harbor channels, an 
alternative catch-monitoring system should be designed, in the form of a catch assessment survey 
or self-monitoring by the fishers using logbooks. In addition to catch, the age or size structure of 
fish populations should be routinely monitored to provide estimates of the fishing mortality rate, F.
 
Sufficient resources (staff, boats, funds, etc.) must be allocated to the management authority 
in order to improve compliance with any new rules and regulations introduced under the 
management plan.
There appears to be strong support for the creation of a co-management organization 
comprising representatives of the main stakeholders, including fishers with a main task to agree 
on stakeholder roles and responsibilities for management based upon their respective roles 
and responsibilities, prior to the formulation of the management plan, to ensure that relevant 
stakeholders have an active role in the formulation of the plan.
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Study purpose and terms of reference
This report, its annexes and its associated literature review form the output against the study terms 
of reference, which are as follows:
• Contribute towards a literature review for Lake Nasser fisheries.
• With the WorldFish staff and consultants, set up a stock assessment survey plan for lake fisheries.  
• Advise on data analysis using up-to-date methods and models.
• Conduct meetings with the main parties involved in the Lake Nasser fisheries.
• Deliver a consultation workshop and seminar on fisheries management options for Lake Nasser.
• Recommend options for improved management of Lake Nasser and Nile River fisheries 
management.
• Write a mission report on management options and stock assessment plans for Aswan fisheries.
INTRODUCTION
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Activities
The findings, conclusions and recommendations 
of this report were based upon (i) a review of 
the literature, drawing heavily from previous 
reviews, including Bishai et al. (2000), van 
Zwieten et al. (2011), Habib et al. (2014) and 
Habib (2015); (ii) visits to three fishing camps 
on the lake and to supporting infrastructure at 
Aswan harbor; and (iii) consultations with key 
stakeholders. A summary of the study activities 
is given in Annex 1.
Stakeholder consultation
Stakeholders who were consulted for their 
views about the management of the lake are 
listed in Table 1.
As well as asking specific questions relevant to 
each stakeholder, interviews with stakeholders 
were loosely structured around the following 
series of 15 questions, which were designed 
to improve understanding of the main issues 
confronting the sustainable management of the 
lake resources and required action to address 
these issues:
• What trends or changes have you observed 
in the fishery?
• What is the current status and health of 
the fishery (underexploited; fully exploited; 
overexploited)?
METHODS
• What are the main problems, issues and 
weaknesses of the fishery? 
• What are the main threats faced by the 
fishery?
• What are the good things about the fishery 
(i.e. its strengths and benefits)?
• Is the fishery well managed? If not, why not?
• How could the management be improved?
• Are control measures (rules and regulations) 
effectively (well) enforced? If not, why not?
• Should the fishery be controlled by 
restrictions of catch or fishing effort, by 
technical measures, or by a combination?
• What roles and responsibilities should or 
could stakeholders have in management 
(e.g. rule-making, monitoring, decision-
making, enforcement, control, etc.)?
• What opportunities exist for the fishery 
(e.g. development of the Nile perch 
fishery, developing export markets, stock 
enhancement, added value, etc.)?
• How much of the catch is landed at the main 
harbors (the official landing sites)?
• Complete the following fish disposal 
pathway diagram. (See Annex 4.)
• How could monitoring of the fishery be 
improved?
• Do you have other comments?
Name Position Institution or organization
Tag El Dein Abu El Rahman Director HDLDA
Mr. Osama Mohammed Kamel Chief of sector Misr Aswan Fishing Company
Mr. Mahmoud Hasseb Executive director GAFRD
Esmail Hagage Abd El Alla Fisher and fish processor -
Dr. Naguib Director (and sediment 
specialist)
National Institute for 
Oceanography and Fisheries (NIOF)
Dr. Agaypi Macro fauna and flora 
specialist
NIOF
Dr. Hussein Amar Adam Fisheries biologist Fishery Management Center (FMC), 
HDLDA
Mr. Murad Zaki Agaypi Fisheries biologist FMC, HDLDA
Fishers (names excluded for 
anonymity reasons)
Fishers At three fishing camps affiliated 
with Misr Aswan Fishing Company
M
ETHODS
Table 1. Stakeholders who were consulted for their views about the management of the lake.
11
M
ETHODS
The responses to these questions were 
also used to analyze the fishery’s strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats using 
the SWOT tool. (See Annex 5.)
A workshop with 20 key management 
stakeholders was also held in an attempt to 
reach consensus on the main issues confronting 
the sustainable management of the lake 
resources and required action to address these 
issues, improve management performance, and 
identify opportunities for the development of 
lake fisheries-dependent livelihoods. Annex 3 
contains the full workshop report, including 
the list of participants. The SWOT analysis 
table is given in Annex 5, and an example of 
a fish disposal pathway diagram is given in 
Annex 4. The key findings of these stakeholder 
consultations are synthesized and cited in the 
Results and Conclusions sections where relevant. 
Groups of fishers were interviewed at three 
fishing camps in the northern sector of the lake, 
which is under the control of the Misr Aswan 
Fishing Company. Due to travel restrictions, 
other locations on the lake could not be visited.
Responses given by the stakeholders consulted 
are summarized in Annexes 1 and 2. 
A preliminary stock assessment
An aggregated multispecies biomass dynamics 
model was fitted to what was regarded as the 
most reliable and up-to-date time series of 
catch and effort data for fresh fish (mainly tilapia 
and Nile perch) in an attempt to explore likely 
values of key target and limit reference points 
for the fishery. The results were compared to 
those generated by earlier assessments and the 
current status of the fishery. 
Fishery management systems
A fishery management system comprises a wide 
array of activities and agreements designed 
to ensure the rational and responsible use of 
living aquatic resources. These activities and 
agreements include governance arrangements 
(policies, laws, use rights, control rules, etc.), 
management procedures (setting objectives, 
control rules, performance measures, reference 
points, etc.), scientific advice (stock assessment, 
scenario modeling, etc.), compliance 
(surveillance, enforcement and voluntary codes) 
and monitoring.
The terms of reference for this study seek 
to generate options for the improved 
management of the fish resources of Lake 
Nasser. Stock assessments and related 
monitoring activities are integral to the 
management system, providing scientific 
advice and information to help design and 
evaluate the performance of the management 
system. However, these activities should be 
regarded as supporting, rather than driving, the 
management process and should be designed 
accordingly.
A framework for fisheries management
This study and its recommendations are 
structured around the fisheries management 
framework described by Hoggarth et al. 
(2006). This system recognizes that a fishery 
management system must acknowledge and 
be adapted to a wide range of influences that 
affect the interaction between the fishery, its 
stakeholders and the aquatic environment. 
The main components of a modern fishery 
management framework are illustrated in 
Figure 1.
This framework provides a relevant, systematic 
and logical structure for the review of the 
system currently in place to manage the fishery 
resources of Lake Nasser, and thereby to make 
recommendations for its future improvement, 
including stock assessment and fisheries 
monitoring activities.
Governing the fishery management process, 
and hence at the head of the framework, is 
the fisheries policy. This includes the goals 
and objectives that the management system 
is intended to address. Interacting with the 
fisheries policy are the management context 
and the management process. The context 
includes factors that will affect the way the 
fishery should be managed. The process 
includes the decision-making processes and the 
specific measures that are used to control the 
fishery. The stock assessment and research to 
provide the scientific advice and technical basis 
for the management are placed in their own 
box to emphasize their integral importance in 
the management process. Arrows between the 
boxes are bi-directional, reflecting the intimate 
and mutually reliant relationships between 
them. The circular arrow emphasizes that the 
12
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stock assessment process should guide the 
management process through regular and 
routine feedback. Management measures could 
be adjusted each year, driven by the status of 
the system, which is indicated by indicators 
and reference points (the stock assessment-
management cycle). The overall system should 
be assessed every 3–5 years. 
Each section of the review findings below 
begins, where relevant, with a brief introduction 
to the meaning and relevance of each element 
of the framework. The situation in Lake 
Nasser for that element is then described. 
More detailed descriptions of the framework 
elements are available in Hoggarth et al. (2006). 
Figure 1. A framework for fishery management illustrating the different elements to be 
addressed in establishing a fishery management system. Source: Hoggarth et al. (2006).
The management context
The legal regime
• Domestic laws
• International agreements
Management approach to 
uncertainty
• Precautionary or adaptive 
management? Or both?
Management scope
• Single or multi-species?
• Ecosystem approach?
Property rights
• Use rights?
• Control rights?
Stakeholder roles in management
• State or community control?
• Co-management?
Fishery scale
• Industrial or artisanal?
• Economically important?
Management capacity
• Technical skills, staff, funds?
Sections 1.1 and 2.1–2.4
Fishery policy
Define management intentions
• Policy goals and operational objectives (biological, ecological, 
economic, other sectors)
Sections 2.5.1
Management process
Fishery management plan
Define management standards
For each operational objective:
• Conceptual reference points (target, 
limit, precautionary)
• Indicators
• Technical reference points
Set management measures
• Decision control rules defined by 
reference points and harvesting 
strategy
• Management strategy, comprising 
one or more control measures (inputs; 
outputs; technical, ecological, etc.)
Monitoring control and surveillance
Sections 2.5.2–2.5.5
Stock assessment 
process
Data/Inputs
Intermediate parameters
Indicators Reference 
points
Management advice in 
terms of risk, allowing for 
uncertainty
Chapters 3 and 4
and Parts 2 and 3
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Fisheries policy
A key first step for management is to specify 
the policies and goals that will drive the 
management process. A fisheries policy is 
usually developed at the national level. It 
applies to all the fisheries in the country and 
broadly describes the purpose for which they 
will be managed.
The policy should be supported by national 
legislation (e.g. the Fisheries Act). The policy 
should be compatible with any binding 
international legal frameworks that the 
country has ratified and any regional fisheries 
organizations to which the country belongs, 
as well as national legislation; e.g. concerning 
biodiversity conservation, protected species, etc.
Policy goals
Guided by policy, broad goals should be set, 
stating specific priorities for each fishery. 
These should focus upon achieving long-term 
sustainable use of the fisheries resources along 
with further aims related to the social and 
economic status of each fishery. 
Fisheries policy in Egypt
According to van Zweiten et al. (2011), fisheries 
policy in Egypt and for Lake Nasser seeks to 
achieve the following: 
RESULTS
• Increase fish production.
• Increase the contribution of Lake Nasser 
fisheries to the gross domestic product.
• Provide employment, particularly for young 
people.
• Improve the incomes and the standard of 
living of local fishers and their families.
• Achieve more rational and sustainable use of 
natural resources of the reservoir.
Operational objectives
To enable managers to monitor progress, the 
policy goals of each fishery should be further 
developed into explicit operational objectives 
(like objectively verifiable indicators in a 
logframe). These should be negotiated with and 
accepted by the stakeholders and linked to a 
clear time frame. They should further be linked 
to indicators and reference points as the basis 
for monitoring and management on an annual 
basis. Goals and objectives are usually divided 
into four categories (Table 2). Biological and 
ecological imperatives must be met first.
Goals and objectives are not always compatible; 
they may be conflicting, since different goals 
are achieved at different levels of fishing effort 
(Figure 2).
Table 2. Examples of fishery goals and operational objectives. Source: Hoggarth et al. (2006).
Goals Operational objectives
Biological To maintain the target species at or 
above the levels necessary to ensure their 
continued productivity
To maintain the stock at all times above 
50% of its mean unexploited level
Ecological To minimize the impacts of fishing on the 
physical environment and on non-target 
(bycatch), associated and dependent 
species
To maintain all non-target, associated and 
dependent species above 50% of their 
mean biomass levels in the absence of 
fishing activities
Economic To maximize the net incomes of the 
participating fishers
To stabilize net income per fisher at 
a level above the national minimum 
desired income
Social To maximize employment opportunities 
for those dependent on the fishery for 
their livelihoods
To include as many of the existing 
participants in the fishery as is possible 
given the biological, ecological and 
economic objectives listed above
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Policy goals and operational objectives: Lake 
Nasser 
The literature review did not reveal any 
specific goals and objectives for the lake’s 
fisheries. Indeed, it remains uncertain if such 
objectives have ever been formally agreed and 
documented. No references to specific goals or 
objectives, or to relevant documentation, were 
made by the stakeholders consulted during 
the study, including the current management 
authority (GAFRD).
An appropriate and effective management 
system for the lake cannot be designed or 
implemented until these goals and objectives 
are explicitly defined and approved by relevant 
stakeholders, and documented.
With reference to Figure 2, and based upon the 
information assembled and preliminary stock 
assessment reported on pages 30–31, it is likely 
that the fishery currently lies close to the point 
on the figure labeled “unmanaged, low cost of 
fishing.”
The management context
The legal regime
Under Law #124, Issued 1983, the Ministry of 
Agriculture has the right to do the following:
• Set minimum gear size and fish landing sizes.
• Restrict the capture of certain species of fish.
• Close areas to fishing.
• Control which fishing gears may be used.
• Determine fish license type and number 
permitted in each zone.
Under this law, all fishers, including crew 
members, must hold a valid license to fish 
on Lake Nasser, and all fishing boats must be 
licensed by the management authority (GAFRD) 
and have an allocated area to fish assigned by 
the fishing cooperative or fishing company.
RESULTS
Figure 2. Possible management objectives for a multispecies resource, their likely relative 
positions along a scale of fishing effort, and other fishery indicators. Source: Hoggarth 
et al. (2006).
Resource user conflicts
Food (MSY)
Profit
Export
Tourism
Minimum 
management
costs
Costs of fishing
Unmanaged
equilibrium
Fishing effort and fishing mortality
Lower fish abundance
Lower catch per unit effort
Smaller fish in catch
Loss of species
Lower value per unit weight
High
High
Low
Low
Yi
el
d
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The Fishery Management Center (FMC) 
recommended the following management 
measures for Lake Nasser. However, it is 
understood that these are not included in 
fisheries legislation and therefore cannot be 
enforced by law:
• A closed season between 15 April and 15 May 
was introduced in 1991 to reduce the capture 
of mature fish (spawners), particularly tilapia, 
during the spawning season.
• A closed area was established in Kalabsha (2–3 
years only), which was stocked with tilapia.
• A minimum mesh size of 12 centimeters (cm) 
has been set for bottom gill nets and trammel 
nets. 
Many stakeholders claimed that, by law, fish may 
only be landed at the official harbors, where it is 
weighed by the HDLDA. However, these claims 
should be treated as questionable because it 
appears that no such legislation exists.
Management approach to uncertainty
The question of how fisheries can best be 
managed is hard to answer, because fishery 
managers face many uncertainties in the 
status and dynamics of the resource and the 
fisheries under their responsibility. Three 
main approaches are employed to address 
this uncertainty: (i) comprehensive rational 
planning; (ii) the precautionary approach; and 
(iii) adaptive management.
Comprehensive rational planning
This is a traditional approach to management that 
assumes that with research, an understanding of 
the resource system can be achieved that leads 
to effective management and control. Little or no 
consideration is given to uncertainty.
The precautionary approach
This approach advocates that the greater 
the uncertainty, the more conservative 
the approach should be. Precautionary 
management is at the core of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
(1995). The Code of Conduct gives the following 
advice:
“7.5.1 States should apply the precautionary 
approach widely to conservation, management 
and exploitation of living aquatic resources 
in order to protect them and preserve the 
aquatic environment. The absence of adequate 
scientific information should not be used 
as a reason for postponing or failing to take 
conservation and management measures.
7.5.2 In implementing the precautionary 
approach, States should take into account, 
inter alia, uncertainties relating to the size 
and productivity of the stocks, reference 
points, stock condition in relation to such 
reference points, levels and distribution of 
fishing mortality and the impact of fishing 
activities, including discards, on non-target 
and associated or dependent species, as well as 
environmental and socio-economic conditions.”
Whereas a comprehensive rational planner 
might aim at setting an exact fishing effort or 
quotas to achieve a model-predicted maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY), a precautionary 
manager would reduce the effort or quotas 
according to the level of uncertainty with which 
the MSY is estimated.
In a well-managed fishery with an expensive 
monitoring and analysis system, this 
precautionary MSY might be quite close to the 
model-predicted MSY. In a data-poor fishery, it 
should be much lower, if the fishery is to keep 
on the safe side.
Adaptive management
Although precautionary management is now 
being used, it tends to provide little information 
about the system being managed. Since the 
MSY of a fishery cannot be predicted well until 
it has been exceeded, too much precaution 
may result in a fishery falling short of its true 
potential, with managers never really knowing 
what might have been. To overcome this 
potential drawback, adaptive management may 
be used alongside the precautionary approach. 
Adaptive management attempts to reduce 
uncertainties over time in a structured process 
of learning by doing (Walters and Hilborn 1978).
Management actions are used or interpreted 
as experiments to learn more about the 
resource system at the same time as it is being 
managed. New knowledge is generated by the 
deliberate use of learning processes instead of 
sticking to rigid technical solutions that may 
be suboptimal. There are two main types of 
adaptive management, passive and active:
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• Passive adaptive management adopts the 
best-fitting model in each year as “true” for 
that year, and only updates management 
policy according to new data that arises 
naturally. Passive adaptive management 
can make use of existing variation in the 
resource system as an experiment. This type 
of adaptive management has the greatest 
potential in resource systems that have a 
high degree of natural variation.
• Active adaptive management attempts to 
produce better information for the long-
term management of the resource. It uses 
management actions to deliberately disturb 
the system in “probing” experiments that 
are designed to enable scientists and other 
stakeholders to learn more quickly about 
the system and its dynamics. 
Management approach to uncertainty: Lake 
Nasser
The management stakeholders of Lake 
Nasser fisheries have adopted the traditional 
comprehensive planning approach to 
management, where little or no consideration 
is given to uncertainty. It is recommended 
that greater acknowledgment of uncertainty 
be adopted in future stock assessments and 
decision-control rules formulated for the fishery 
if a more stock assessment-driven approach to 
management is to be pursued in the future.
Table 3. Summary of the approaches to uncertainty and their advantages and disadvantages. 
Source: Hoggarth et al. (2006).
Management options Advantages/application Disadvantages/comments
Comprehensive 
rational planning
• Assumes that management 
outcomes can be predicted 
with certainty and that available 
knowledge provides an adequate 
basis for sound management
• Suitable for conditions of low or no 
uncertainty about resource status, 
etc.
• High risk of failing to achieve 
management goals in most 
fisheries, due to many 
uncertainties about resource 
dynamics and the interaction 
with human aspects of the 
system, including the effects 
of alternative management 
options
Precautionary • Reduces risks according to level of 
uncertainty and potential danger
• Encourages involvement of 
industry in providing good data 
by shifting the burden of proof
• May limit exploitation below 
maximum potential where 
uncertainty remains high
• May limit opportunities to 
increase knowledge about the 
system if applied too rigidly
Adaptive • Reduces uncertainty by 
experimentation and/or analysis of 
existing variation
• Most useful in spatially structured 
waters (inland, coastal), and for less 
mobile stocks
• Use “passive” approach where 
natural variation gives contrast
• Use “active” approach for fastest 
learning
• Can be applied within a 
precautionary framework by 
making experiments in limited 
areas and keeping other areas as 
“buffers”
• Active approach requires 
industry commitment to 
principle of experimentation, 
which may increase variability 
in catches
• Harder to apply in large 
offshore fisheries with an 
indivisible unit stock
• Need to make large 
adjustments to “treatments” 
to generate observable 
effects
RESULTS
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Management scope Advantages/application Disadvantages/comments
Single species • Simplifies models to main fishery 
control parameters (e.g. effort, 
catch, technical measures)
• Ignores interactions with 
other species and the wider 
environment
• May lead to overly optimistic 
management advice
Multispecies • Extends focus to all main species 
in fishery
• At simple level, aims to limit 
bycatch, discarding, etc.
• Use aggregated biomass dynamic 
models, or analytical models with 
technical interactions
• Analytical models with full 
biological interactions hard to 
apply
• Hard to optimize controls for 
all species simultaneously—
need to accept some 
tradeoffs
Ecosystem • Seeks to maintain biological 
diversity, habitats and ecosystem 
functions
• Management options include use 
of networks of marine protected 
areas (MPAs), prevention of 
bycatches, discards and gear 
damage, etc.
• Common sense measures can be 
applied to “tractable” ecosystem 
problems
• Food web and trophic level 
models not yet useful in 
providing implementable 
management advice
• Hard to distinguish relative 
effects of fishing and 
environmental factors on fish 
stocks, and hence appropriate 
management responses
The existing access rights to the fishery 
effectively create recognized fishing areas 
along the lakeshore. These areas offer potential 
for adaptive management, where fishing 
areas could form management units to 
receive “treatments” as part of management 
experiments. This would require the devolution 
of management authority to fishers with rights 
over these areas to enable them to control the 
access of other fishers and possibly grant them 
rights to set rules and regulations within their 
boundaries.
Management scope (single, multispecies or 
ecosystem approach)
The traditional paradigm of fishery management 
is that the productivity of a stock is a property 
of its size and reproductive potential and that a 
manager needs only to control fishing activities 
to maintain the size of the stock and protect 
breeding fish to achieve a good yield. However, 
most fish stocks share their waters with many 
other fish species, of different sizes and life 
histories, and are caught by a range of different 
fishing vessels and gears. Applying the optimum 
single-species management controls for all 
species and gears at the same time is usually 
impossible, and some compromises need to be 
made (Hoggarth et al. 2006). 
Nevertheless, the assessment and management 
of unit stocks of single fish species can provide 
a good start for considering management 
actions even for complex ecosystems. They 
are likely to remain the best tools for assessing 
many fisheries based on one or a few main 
target species for many years. Where stocks 
interact with other species and fleets, or with 
the wider environment in various ways, some 
compromises or adjustments will also need to 
be made. 
While approaches to dealing with technical 
interactions in multispecies fisheries 
are relatively straightforward, biological 
interactions are far more challenging (Table 4). 
Table 4. Summary of alternative scope and scale of management. Source: Hoggarth et al. (2006).
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Ecosystem management
The ecosystem approach aims to consider 
all significant interactions between species, 
sectors and the wider environment. The 
ecosystem approach implies a holistic strategy 
for management, aiming to ensure that flora 
and fauna are maintained at viable levels in 
their native habitats and that the integrity of 
ecosystems is maintained as far as possible while 
supporting sustainable levels of human use. The 
FAO has adopted the term “ecosystem approach 
to fisheries” and has defined its purpose as “to 
plan, develop and manage fisheries in a manner 
that addresses the multiplicity of societal needs 
and desires, without jeopardizing the options 
for future generations to benefit from a full 
range of goods and services provided by marine 
ecosystems” (Garcia et al. 2003).
Recognizing the difficulty in reconciling 
differences in ecosystem and fisheries 
management (particularly managing biological 
interactions), a common-sense application of 
the ecosystem approach has been proposed, 
focusing on the more tractable problems, 
where the relationship between cause and 
effect is relatively clear. These include the 
direct effects of fishing activity on target 
and nontarget species, such as those due 
to bycatch, incidental mortality and the 
destruction of habitats.
Management scope: Lake Nasser
Since the fisheries of Lake Nasser target mainly 
species of tilapia, single-species approaches 
to management have been employed. These 
have focused upon setting minimum net-mesh 
and fish-landing sizes to prevent growth and 
recruitment overfishing, as well as a closed 
season to protect spawning tilapia. Growth 
overfishing occurs when fish are harvested at 
an average size that is smaller than the size 
that would produce the maximum yield per 
recruit. Recruitment overfishing occurs when 
the mature adult population is depleted to a 
level where it no longer has the reproductive 
capacity to replenish itself.
Single-species approaches are likely to 
provide reasonable results at least in the short 
term until more capacity and experience 
make the application of more complex and 
data-demanding multispecies approaches 
possible. However, it is recommended that the 
assessments used to set these regulations be 
updated and possibly extended to account for 
multiple species.
Attempts have been made in the past (1998) 
to fit aggregated biomass dynamics models 
for the multispecies assemblage, but they have 
used equilibrium assumptions and regression 
methods (Habib et al. 2014). Furthermore, it 
appears that the reference points generated 
by these models were not used to monitor 
management performance or to formulate 
control rules for the fishery. 
Previous studies have acknowledged potential 
ecosystem influences by exploring the effects 
of lake-level variation on fish recruitment and 
yield. However, the results of these studies have 
not been used to manage water levels for the 
benefit of the lake’s fisheries.
It is therefore recommended that the effects 
of lake-level fluctuations on the fishery be 
explored in more detail. A biomass dynamics 
model with extra terms to account for lake-level 
fluctuation could provide a means to explore 
these effects and generate guidance for water-
level management.
In recognition of ecosystem management, the 
management authority attempts to control 
destructive fishing practices, such as the use of 
poisons, explosives and electric fishing.
Property rights
Property rights govern who can do what with 
respect to the resource system. They can be 
divided into two groups: (i) use rights and (ii) 
control rights. (See Table 5)
Use rights
These govern the use of the resource and can 
be divided into access rights and withdrawal or 
harvesting rights. Access rights authorize entry 
into the fishery or into a specific fishing ground. 
Withdrawal (harvesting) rights typically involve 
the right to a specific amount of fishing effort 
(e.g. to fish for a certain amount of time or with 
a certain amount of gear) or the right to take a 
specific catch (quota or trip limit systems).
Control rights
These authorize the making of rules and 
imposition of restrictions. Control rights include 
RESULTS
19
RESULTS
Use rights options Advantages/application Disadvantages/comments
Open access • Absence of any property rights
• May be seen as most equitable 
arrangement by some societies
• Cause of the “tragedy of the 
commons”
• To be avoided where possible, 
or supported by strong 
technical measures ensuring 
sustainability even with high F
Access rights • Limitations on who may operate in 
a specific fishing ground (territorial 
use rights in fisheries [TURFs]) or 
fishery (limited licensing)
• TURFs most applicable to small-
scale inshore fisheries and co-
management
• Limited licensing applicable to 
larger, offshore industrial-scale 
fisheries
• Need fair and transparent 
allocation systems to ensure 
legitimacy and equity
• Access right holders may 
still race to catch fish, giving 
incentives to increase effort or 
capacity
Harvest/withdrawal 
rights
• Include “input rights” to apply a 
certain type or amount of fishing 
effort (e.g. number of fish pots or 
days at sea) ...
• ... and “output rights” to take a 
certain catch, e.g. a specified 
proportion of the annual TAC 
(individual quotas or individual 
transferable quotas)
• May be allocated permanently or 
temporarily
• May be transferable (tradable) or not
• Output rights may reduce race to 
fish and overcapacity
• May increase discards for 
“highgrading”
• Individual transferable quotas 
may cause social disruption if 
efficient companies buy out 
smaller operators
• With input rights, need to 
monitor increase in effective F 
due to increasing catchability 
(i.e. “technology creep”)
• Output rights may be harder 
and more expensive to apply 
than input rights
exclusion rights, which allow the holder to 
determine who may use the resource, and 
alienation rights, which enable the holder 
to transfer rights to others (for example, by 
inheritance or through sale or lease). Control 
rights provide the underlying basis for fisheries 
co-management.
Property rights: Lake Nasser
Since 1981, one company (Misr Aswan) and 
four cooperatives have had rights to control 
the access of fishers to their fishing zones 
(Habib 2015). Within their respective zones, 
the company and cooperatives allocate fishing 
areas to their members and are responsible for 
supervising their fishing activities. The nature 
of this supervision is unclear. Originally, each 
cooperative society operated carrier boats to 
collect catches from fishers and supply them 
Table 5. Summary of alternative use rights in fisheries. Source: Hoggarth et al. (2006).
with food, fuel, ice and equipment. However, 
this arrangement has not been operating 
recently in the zones allocated to cooperatives, 
and currently Misr Aswan only operates three 
carrier boats.
Fishers may only (re-)apply for a fishing boat 
license (required by law) if their application 
to the management authority (GAFRD) 
is accompanied by a letter confirming 
membership in a cooperative or Misr Aswan 
and their fishing area allocation. A boat and 
fishing license effectively grants fishers access 
rights to the resource. It appears that there are 
no restrictions on the number of boat licenses 
that can be issued to individuals or families 
having membership in these organizations, and 
there are no restrictions on the amount of catch 
that can be taken.
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Management options Advantages/application Disadvantages/comments
Government command 
and control
• Strict, “top-down” control applicable 
in some large-scale fisheries, where 
co-management not feasible or 
where government control required 
to resolve otherwise insoluble 
conflicts
• May not be well adapted to 
the special needs of local 
stakeholders
• Usually hard to enforce and 
expensive to administer
Co-management/
partnerships
• Shares roles and responsibilities 
for management and enforcement 
(particularly valuable where 
government capacity is limited)
• Develops more effective local rules 
by combining local knowledge 
with the scientific and technical 
know-how of government agencies
• Where users agree with the 
system adopted, illegal fishing 
and enforcement costs may be 
reduced
• Traditional community-based 
management systems may be 
supported by government, where 
they are compatible with state 
goals, e.g. for sustainability and 
equity
• Most common in small-scale 
fisheries, e.g. in coastal or inshore 
areas, subdivided and managed 
as “TURFs,” but increasingly 
recognized as valuable in large 
scale fisheries also
• As well as sharing 
management tasks, need 
to share decision making 
power and allocate use 
rights (e.g. in TURFs), to 
strengthen incentives for user 
participation
• Potentially high costs 
of developing workable 
arrangements
• Developing trust and respect 
among stakeholders with 
different perspectives, skills 
and knowledge requires 
good social development and 
facilitation skills
• Not applicable in all situations 
(but conditions increasing 
chances of success well 
known)
• Can create transaction and 
other costs for those involved 
(as can command and control 
structures)
Reports suggest that Misr Aswan has sought to 
control the price it pays for fish caught by fishers 
in its zone by threatening to not provide the 
official confirmation of their membership when 
its members re-apply for their boat license. It may 
also report its members to the aquatic police if 
it deems supplies of fish from its members are 
too low. In contrast, the cooperatives no longer 
operate service boats or buy fish, so they do not 
have this type of leverage.
Stakeholder roles in management
Fisheries may be managed purely by the state 
or by the fisher community. However, following 
the failure of many existing centralized, state-
controlled management arrangements or 
because of economically driven reforms, a 
popular response has been to devolve some 
fishery management responsibilities to resource 
users and other stakeholders.
Table 6. Co-management arrangements in fisheries management. Source: Hoggarth et al. (2006).
The FAO Technical Guidelines for 
Responsible Fisheries (1997) promote 
management partnerships involving the 
different stakeholders in the fishery. Such 
co-management arrangements need to 
be carefully negotiated and detailed in a 
management plan. The stakeholders involved 
and their roles and responsibilities will be very 
context dependent and may need to change 
over time. Their roles and responsibilities should 
reflect their capacity and stake in the fishery.
Although there are clear benefits, experiences 
with co-management, including within a 
number of Fisheries Management Science 
Program projects, have shown that it is neither 
simple nor quick to establish (Table 6).
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Fishers landing their catch at Aswan High Dam landing site, Lake Nasser, Aswan.
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Stakeholder roles in management: Lake Nasser
Descriptions of the key management 
stakeholders and institutions and their 
respective roles and responsibilities are poorly 
documented in the literature (Habib 2015). 
GAFRD is the main management authority 
for the lake’s fish resources and is responsible 
for monitoring and controlling the fishery, 
including the issuing of fishing licenses. The 
HDLDA was the former management authority. 
Responsibility for the management of the 
lake’s resources was transferred from the 
HDLDA to GAFRD in May 2010. The HDLDA 
continues to monitor landings at the main 
harbors. The Fishery Management Center 
(FMC) of the HDLDA is responsible for research 
and providing scientific advice, but currently 
has no capacity in these fields. The National 
Institute for Oceanography and Fisheries 
(NIOF) also provides scientific advice with 
respect to fisheries but like FMC currently has 
little or no capacity at Aswan to do so. The 
fishing company and cooperatives allocate 
access rights to the fishery and grant fishers 
permission to apply for a boat license to fish 
in their designated zones. They also provide 
supporting services to fishers, and in Misr 
Aswan’s case, also purchase some of their catch.
The arrangements between institutions 
appear complex and far from transparent. 
Comprehensive stakeholder and institutional 
analyses remain outstanding and will need 
to be undertaken before changes to the 
existing management system can be proposed. 
This should include a detailed description 
of the institutions’ management roles and 
responsibilities.
Scale of fishery 
The scale of the fishery will also have a large 
bearing on the design of the management 
system. It can influence stakeholder roles 
and responsibilities, harvesting strategies, 
management measures (input and output 
controls, technical measures, etc.), fishery 
indicators and monitoring programs, and the 
relative emphasis placed upon stock assessment.
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For example, large-scale fisheries may be 
appropriately managed using state command-
and-control approaches. Harvesting strategies 
based upon the control of fishing effort may be 
difficult to enforce in small-scale fisheries partly 
because artisanal fishers are often among the 
poorest of the poor, with no alternative source 
of income, and politicians may be reluctant to 
enforce measures that may have painful short-
term impacts, even if long-term benefits are 
possible. 
At the same time, quotas can be problematic for 
small-scale fisheries due to poor enforcement, 
inaccurate catch reporting, difficulties in 
predicting next year’s stock size and the 
potential catch, and the multispecies nature of 
stocks.
While technical measures require some capacity 
for enforcement to ensure that rules are 
complied with, enforcement may nevertheless 
be simpler for technical measures than for 
input and output controls. Technical measures 
that can be easily communicated, that relate 
intuitively to the status of the resource and that 
can be enforced at the community level may be 
very appropriate for small-scale fisheries and 
co-management arrangements.
For small-scale fish stocks in developing 
countries, Mahon (1997) has argued that 
management efforts should be more 
“management objective driven” than “stock 
assessment driven.” For small-scale and co-
managed fisheries, a greater emphasis may 
be placed on the use of traditional ecological 
knowledge and participatory appraisals.
This guidance should be considered when 
formulating a new management plan for the 
small-scale fishery of Lake Nasser. 
Management capacity
Management capacity includes technical 
skills, staff and funds. It is important to audit 
management capacity when designing new 
management systems since it will have an 
enormous bearing on virtually all elements of 
the system design, including stakeholder roles 
and responsibilities, management strategy, and 
stock assessment methodologies, as well as 
monitoring, control and surveillance activities.
Management capacity: Lake Nasser
Management capacity among the Lake Nasser 
fishery stakeholders generally appears low. 
The main management authority (GAFRD) 
appears to have only superficial knowledge and 
understanding of fisheries management, and 
no familiarity with stock assessment.
Resources, including staff, patrol vessels and 
funds for monitoring, control and surveillance, 
are reported to be inadequate. The Director 
of GAFRD in Aswan estimated that the 
monitoring, control and surveillance budget 
would need to be doubled before the fishery 
could be effectively monitored and controlled. 
This lack of surveillance capacity has resulted 
in unreliable monitoring of the fishery, poor 
compliance with existing management 
measures, and unlicensed fishing activities. 
Currently there is no provision of scientific 
(stock assessment) advice. Technical capacity 
could be built by drawing upon former FMC 
employees and existing NIOF staff (located in 
other regions of Egypt) to potentially provide 
stock assessment and technical advice to 
GAFRD to improve management. Some 
capacity building in the latest stock assessment 
models and software might be required.
Some stakeholders consulted suggested that 
awareness-raising among fishers of the need 
for management and related controls was also 
required. 
The management process
Management can be defined as “the integrated 
process of information gathering, analysis, 
planning, consultation, decision-making, 
allocation of resources and formulation 
and implementation, with enforcement 
as necessary, of regulations or rules which 
govern fisheries activities in order to ensure 
the continued productivity of the resources 
and the accomplishment of other fisheries 
objectives” (Hoggarth et al. 2006). It translates 
the operational objectives into clear standards 
and ways of measuring them (through 
reference points and indicators) and sets 
the actions by which they will be achieved. 
The full management process for the fishery 
should be clearly outlined for stakeholders in a 
management plan.
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Management plans
Management plans serve as an important 
reference and information source for the 
stakeholders involved in the management 
of the resource. They summarize the state of 
knowledge of the resource, its environment 
and the fishery, management objectives 
and strategy, details of the monitoring and 
evaluation approaches adopted, and agreed 
management roles and responsibilities of key 
stakeholders and any other interested parties. 
Guidelines for the formulation of management 
plans and design of monitoring programs for 
co-managed fisheries are described by Halls et 
al. (2005).
Management plans: Lake Nasser
It is understood that no management plans 
exist or have been formulated in the past for 
the fish resources of Lake Nasser. It is therefore 
recommended that a management plan be 
formulated with key stakeholders following 
an updated stock assessment of the lake’s 
resources. The management plan should be 
updated at least every 3–5 years. The contents 
of the management plan should aim to include 
detailed descriptions of the following: 
• resource and environment
• fishery
• stakeholders
• management roles and responsibilities
• fisheries policy
• goals and operational objectives for each 
fishery
• management standards (indicators and 
reference points)
• harvesting strategy
• decision-control rules
• management measures
• monitoring, control and surveillance 
activities
• results of previous assessments
• current assessment and required action 
• recommendations.
Management standards
Indicators and reference points
To monitor the progress of the fishery and to 
measure the performance of management 
in achieving the objectives, managers need 
indicators and reference points. Each indicator 
should be linked to one or more reference 
points and used to track the state of the fishery 
relative to those reference points. Indicators 
could include catch, fishing effort (f), catch per 
unit effort (CPUE) and fishing mortality (F).
Management performance is measured as 
the position of the indicator relative to the 
reference point, often expressed as a ratio.
Reference points are typically categorized as 
either target or limit reference points. Target 
reference points correspond to situations 
considered desirable and to be achieved on 
average, and limit reference points indicate 
situations that are undesirable and to be 
avoided at all costs. Managers would seek 
to reduce fishing by a certain amount if a 
performance indicator falls below the target 
reference point, and to stop fishing altogether 
if their limit reference point is ever breached. 
Precautionary reference points are those that 
take account of uncertainties and risk. (See 
page 34 of Hoggarth et al. 2006 for further 
details.)
Reference points and indicators are commonly 
based on agreed scientific procedures and/or 
models. Examples of common target reference 
points are given below:
YMSY maximum sustainable yield (Y) in 
a production model
YmaxYPR maximum sustainable yield (Y) 
per recruit
fMSY fishing effort (f) giving maximum 
sustainable yield in a production 
model
FMSY fishing mortality (F) giving 
the maximum total yield in a 
production model
F0.1 F at which the slope of the YPR 
curve is 10% of its slope at the 
origin
F20%SPR F giving a spawning stock 
biomass per recruit of 20% of the 
unfished level
Blim biomass limit reference point; e.g. 
20% of the unexploited biomass, 
B0 (0.2B0).
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Indicators and reference points: Lake Nasser
Reference points have been estimated for single 
species and multiple species in Lake Nasser in 
the past (1998). These were YMSY and fMSY and 
YmaxYPR (Habib 2015). However, it appears they 
were not employed as a reference to monitor 
management performance or to control 
harvesting.
Currently, it appears that catch is the main 
indicator of management performance. No 
attempts are made to monitor other important 
indicators such as fishing mortality, F, or 
spawning stock biomass. Boat licenses or the 
number of active boats can provide an index 
of effort, but these appear poorly recorded 
judging by existing gaps in the records.
RESULTS
Management measures
The reference points described above should 
be agreed with stakeholders in advance and 
used to trigger specific conservation and 
management actions, also agreed in advance. 
Such agreements may be formalized as 
harvesting strategies and decision-control rules 
and should be described in the management 
plan. These jointly define how reference points 
will trigger particular action. Both the harvesting 
strategies and the control rules should be 
clearly specified in mathematical or logical 
terms and should show what management 
action (e.g. an adjustment to next year’s level 
of fishing mortality, F, or total allowable catch) 
will be taken, depending on the positions of the 
indicators relevant to the reference points.
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Fish trader loading fish at one of the Aswan High Dam landing sites, Lake Nasser, Aswan.
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Harvest strategy
A harvesting strategy defines how the allowable 
catch will be determined or calculated each 
year. It may simply state, for example, that 
harvesting will be restricted to only males of 
the species (e.g. for crabs) or to only fish above 
a minimum size limit. It may also specify what 
level of catch will be taken depending on the 
current size of the fish stock. Such stock-size-
dependent harvesting strategies fall into three 
main types: (i) constant harvest rate (i.e. fishing 
mortality, F, set as a proportion of the stock); 
(ii) constant escapement or stock size; and (iii) 
constant catch (usually set as a quota or total 
allowable catch).
Harvest strategy: Lake Nasser
For Lake Nasser, the harvesting strategy is to 
limit harvesting only to fish above a minimum 
size limit (500 grams [g] for tilapia) and to fish 
sizes resulting from the minimum mesh size 
regulations. Managers have also sought to limit 
harvesting to nonbreeding fish (implemented 
by means of a closed season).
There are no apparent efforts to apply other 
harvesting strategies, such as controlling fishing 
mortality or catch as a proportion of stock size.
Decision-control rules (defined by reference 
points and harvesting strategy)
Decision-control rules define what 
management action should be taken in 
response to changes in the fishery or resource 
status. For example, fishing effort may be 
allowed to increase at a given rate (e.g. 5% per 
annum) until the limit reference point (BMSY) has 
been met, after which no further increases in 
fishing effort f or mortality F may be permitted.
For depleted stocks, the decision-control rules 
may first need to focus upon incremental 
reductions in fishing effort or fishing mortality 
to rebuild the stock towards a target reference 
point such as BMSY.
Achieving agreement on decision-control rules 
of this nature is one of the major challenges for 
fishery managers, but a necessary step in the 
long term.
Decision-control rules: Lake Nasser
It appears that no control rules have been set 
for the fishery. This probably reflects the paucity 
of relevant fishery indicators and reference 
points selected to monitor management 
performance and progress towards the 
achievement of specific objectives for the 
fishery. It may also explain why the resource 
is now (apparently) significantly depleted 
and beyond conventional limit reference 
points. (See the Summary, Conclusions and 
Recommendations.)
Management strategy
Once operational objectives, reference points, a 
harvesting strategy and decision-control rules 
have been defined and agreed, a management 
strategy can be developed. The management 
strategy is the sum of all the management 
measures that are selected to achieve the 
biological, ecological, economic and social 
objectives of the fishery.
Management measures are categorized as 
follows: 
• technical (e.g. size limits, mesh sizes, closed 
seasons, closed areas and gear restrictions);
• input (effort) and output (catch) controls;
• access rights designed around input and 
output controls. 
Technical measures control how, where and 
when the catch is taken and are often set 
as permanent regulations or changed only 
infrequently. Input and output measures are 
used to control the total amount of fishing, 
either as the effort applied or the catches taken. 
Input and output measures are most commonly 
used as flexible controls to supplement any 
technical measures and to fine tune the levels 
of fishing pressure each year in response to the 
latest stock assessment data.
Technical measures
While input and output measures attempt to 
control the overall level of fishing pressure, 
technical measures aim to control the 
exploitation pattern of the fishery. The main 
technical measures are size limits (either 
of the sizes of fish or the mesh sizes of the 
gear), closed seasons, closed areas, and gear 
restrictions or bans. They are usually designed 
to protect reproductive potential, prevent 
growth overfishing, or prevent the use of 
destructive fishing gears.
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Technical measures for protecting reproductive 
capacity include size limits, closed areas or 
closed seasons that are designed to protect 
spawning stocks, as well as restrictions on the 
harvest of reproductively active animals such as 
mouth-brooding tilapia. 
Size limits are set nominally in relation to the 
size at maturity or according to some technical 
reference point (e.g. to achieve a particular 
percent of spawning potential ratio [SPR], 
depending also on the level of F). A spawn-at-
least-once policy makes a fish stock resilient to 
collapse even when fishing mortality rates rise 
above target levels. 
The same types of measures can be used for 
preventing growth overfishing. In this case, 
closed areas could be set to protect juvenile or 
nursery grounds, or closed seasons could be 
designed to avoid fishing at times when fish are 
mostly small or reproductively active.
Technical measures may either be set with a 
combination of common sense and limited 
technical data, or using the output of models. 
Optimal size limits and the timings of closed 
seasons can be estimated using analytical 
yield (age-structured models) or YPR models 
accounting for gear selectivity. The benefits of 
closed areas are more difficult to predict due to 
the high dependence on the movement patterns 
of the fish, which will usually not be well known.
All such technical measures require some 
capacity for enforcement to ensure that 
rules are complied with. Enforcement may 
nevertheless be simpler for technical measures 
than for input and output controls. Technical 
measures also have the advantage that they can 
be easily communicated and can be enforced at 
the community level, making them appropriate 
for small-scale fisheries such as Lake Nasser and 
co-management arrangements should they 
evolve on the lake.
Input and output controls
Effort controls (fishing effort restrictions) aim to 
limit fishing mortality (F) by controlling one or 
more of the following factors: 
• the total number of vessels in the fishery 
(e.g. by allocating limited access rights and 
restricting the number of licenses issued);
• the effort allowed by each individual vessel 
(e.g. the number of gear units allowed or the 
number of trips that may be made each year);
• the power of individual vessels (e.g. the size 
or engine power of the vessels, or the types 
of gear that may be used).
Catch controls such as total allowable catches 
(quotas) indirectly control the fishing mortality, 
F. Quotas are not recommended for small-scale 
fisheries due to poor enforcement, inaccurate 
catch reporting, difficulties in predicting next 
year’s stock size and the potential catch, and 
the multispecies nature of stocks. The fisheries 
of Lake Nasser appear to exhibit all of these 
characteristics.
Management strategy: Lake Nasser
It is understood that the management strategy 
for Lake Nasser comprises the following:
• A closed season. The season was from 
15 April to 15 May to protect mature fish, 
particularly tilapia, during the spawning 
season. It appears this closure has not been 
effectively enforced since 2011.
• A minimum mesh size of 12 cm for bottom-
set gillnets and trammel nets. The aim is to 
prevent fishers catching small tilapia (less than 
25 cm in length or body weight of less than 
500 g) to maintain the reproductive capacity 
of the stock and to prevent recruitment 
overfishing. These size restrictions appear to 
have been formulated on the basis of a YPR 
analysis described by Mekkawy (1998), but 
this cannot be confirmed.
• Ad hoc stock enhancement. Stocking of 
Nile tilapia fingerlings has been undertaken 
since 1988 following the construction of nine 
hatcheries by the HDLDA. The full capacity 
of the hatcheries was up to 150 million 
Nile tilapia fingerlings (although these 
production levels were never achieved), 
and the fish were stocked each year in four 
locations: Aswan, Garf Hussein, Abu Simbel 
and Tushka. Habib (2015) reports that the 
FMC released finger-length O. niloticus in 
the south part of Khor Kalabsha every year 
from 1988 to 1993 in varying numbers. A 
robust statistical assessment of the impacts 
(benefits) of this stock enhancement is 
required.
No input and output controls are employed. 
While boat and fisher licenses are required in 
order to fish in the lake, it appears that these 
RESULTS
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Nile perch caught in Lake Nasser, Aswan.
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licensing systems are not used to control fishing 
effort. There are no restrictions on the number 
of vessel or fishing licenses that can be issued 
and no restrictions on the amount of catch that 
can be taken.
Monitoring, control and surveillance
A system for monitoring, control and 
surveillance is integral to the effective 
implementation and review of the 
management system.
Indicators of the fishery must be regularly 
monitored in relation to reference points. 
Inputs to the fishery must also be monitored. 
Data to estimate target and limit reference 
points is also required. This in turn may require 
data to estimate intermediate parameters 
as determined by the models and analytical 
methods employed for the stock assessment. 
The types and frequency of data collected 
will therefore be influenced by a whole 
host of factors, including management 
objectives, harvest strategies, control rules, 
the management strategy, and capacity and 
resources. Basic data include catch, effort, 
abundance (CPUE), size composition of the stock 
(age or length frequency data), and biological 
data (e.g. size at maturity, natural mortality 
rates, etc.). Programs to enforce management 
measures and controls are also required. 
Monitoring, control and surveillance: Lake 
Nasser 
Data collection
Historically, data collection has focused 
upon catch, which until 2004 recorded catch 
disaggregated by species. Since 2004, the catch 
has been recorded as either fresh or salted 
(Habib 2015).
However, no catch assessment or frame surveys 
have been undertaken on the lake. Carrier boat 
landings and supplies of fish transported by 
road to the three main harbors are weighed 
and enumerated by the management authority. 
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Carrier boat records of fish weights purchased 
from each fisher are used to check the total 
landed weight. Any fish not passing through 
the three main harbors will be unreported in 
the catch statistics. Carrier boat records also 
provide an estimate of the number of active 
vessels that can be checked against the vessel 
license register to estimate fishing effort.
Due to price-control mechanisms previously 
implemented—initially by the state, and 
apparently now informally by Misr Aswan—
fishers often sell all or part of their catch to 
private traders or by themselves and often not 
via the three main official harbors. Official catch 
landings are therefore likely to underestimate 
the true catch of the fishery. It has not been 
possible to estimate the bias in the catch 
statistics, but anecdotal evidence suggests that 
it could be significant. Some fishers also report 
selling their catches via unofficial (unrecorded) 
channels to avoid paying tax on their catches if 
they exceed 5 metric tons (t) per annum.
Discussions held with stakeholders suggest 
that undocumented adjustments to estimates 
of catch have been made in the past to 
account for under-reporting and unrecorded 
landings, particularly during the past 15 years. 
To complicate matters further, GAFRD and 
the HDLDA appear to collect and report (and 
possibly adjust) their own data sets.
Both fishers and boats must hold a valid license 
to fish issued by the management authority 
(GAFRD). These licenses must be renewed each 
year. A vessel license register is maintained, and 
annual fishing effort is estimated as the number 
of licensed vessels appearing on this register. 
Any unlicensed vessels will not be included 
in the estimate of fishing effort. Anecdotal 
evidence and reports suggest that a significant 
proportion of vessels operating on the lake are 
unlicensed.
The reliability of both the catch and the effort 
statistics for the purposes of management 
is therefore questionable. Improving the 
rigor of basic catch and effort data collection 
and reporting procedures will therefore be 
fundamental to improving the management of 
the lake’s resources.
No monitoring of other fishery indicators such 
as fishing mortality (F) or attempts to estimate 
(update) intermediate fishery parameters 
(growth and mortality) by sampling the size 
or age structure of the fishery are currently 
undertaken.
Surveillance and control
The current management authority (GAFRD) 
reports that its capacity and resources fall short 
of those necessary to effectively monitor and 
control the fishery by means of the existing 
technical measures (gear restrictions, landing 
size restrictions and closed season). It also 
appears that it is unable to enforce compliance 
with boat licensing requirements, as evidenced 
by the extent of noncompliance reported by 
fishers as well as GAFRD itself. 
The stock assessment process
The role of stock assessment in the 
management process includes the 
identification of well-defined reference points 
for the fishery and the regular (e.g. annual) 
assessment of indicators showing the status 
of the fishery and the fish stock relative to the 
reference points.
Stock assessment is not the purpose of 
management, but is one step in a much larger 
process intended to achieve management 
objectives under conditions of uncertainty.
The types of stock assessments that will be 
appropriate mainly depend on the size and 
value of the fishery and the resources and 
capacity of the fishery service. They include 
initial investigations of the fishery and seek to 
answer simple questions such as the following:
• What types of fish are out there? 
• Where are they? 
• How many are there? 
• What species are being caught? 
• Who is catching them? 
• How are they doing it? 
To provide detailed management advice, the 
stock assessment process becomes more 
refined to answer the specific questions posed 
by fishery managers:
• How fast do the fish grow? 
• How quickly do they reproduce? 
• What is the best size to start catching them? 
• How much can we catch sustainably?
RESULTS
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 Boxes of tilapia being transferred from a service boat to a trader at Aswan High Dam landing site.
This involves the estimation of basic 
intermediate parameters, such as growth rates, 
mortality rates, carrying capacity, maturity 
and reproduction, stock and recruitment, 
selectivity, and catchability. Indicators of the 
current condition of the fishery are selected 
and reference points estimated as a basis for 
developing management advice. See Hoggarth 
et al. (2006) for descriptions of the process, as 
well as conventional models and methods.
Stock assessment: Lake Nasser
No significant stock assessments have been 
undertaken for more than 17 years, since 
Mekkawy (1998). Previous stock assessments 
appear to have been preoccupied with 
estimating potential and maximum sustainable 
yields (Habib 2015). Little consideration was 
given to estimating corresponding input 
controls (fishing effort and mortality) or to 
estimating limit reference points associated 
with the (spawning) stock biomass (Blim). Most 
of the estimates of YMSY were likely to be biased 
as a result of the model fitting procedures 
and model assumptions. Their predictions of 
yield were therefore likely to have been overly 
optimistic—that is, too high (Hilborn and 
Walters 1992).
Some intermediate parameters (growth and 
mortality) were estimated mainly for the main 
species of tilapia and subsequently used for YPR 
assessments designed to generate advice on 
the optimal size at first capture under different 
rates of exploitation. Some selectivity and 
maturity studies were also undertaken (Habib 
2015).
Judging by the accounts of all the stakeholders 
consulted, the observed trends in the fishery, 
and the results of the preliminary stock 
assessment described in the following section, 
the fish resources of Lake Nasser appear to 
be heavily or overexploited with significant 
overcapacity. An updated stock assessment 
is required to help formulate a management 
plan to rebuild the fishery and to manage it in a 
sustainable manner.
RESULTS
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Time series of catch and effort data assembled 
from the HDLDA was used to fit a biomass 
dynamics model for fresh fish (mainly tilapia 
and Nile perch) based upon the Schaefer model 
of stock dynamics (Haddon 2001):
where r is the population growth rate and K is 
the maximum population biomass. The model 
was fitted to observed catch rates in each year, 
It. The predicted catch rate for year t is
The best model fit was judged as the set of 
parameters that minimized the sum of squared 
normal random residual errors for CPUE:
Initial parameter estimates
K was initially set to 200,000 t based upon
Gulland’s potential yield estimator (B=YMSY/0.5M). 
M was set at 0.3/year based upon published 
estimates (see Habib 2015), and YMSY was 
estimated to be approximately equal to the 
maximum yield of fresh fish observed in 1981 
(approximately 31,000 t). The value of q was 
initially set to 0.00035 based upon previously 
published estimates (Mekkawy 1998). The 
biomass at the start of the time series expressed 
as a proportion of K—the initial proportion—was 
varied from 0.8 to 0.95.
Best-fitting models
The best-fitting models and corresponding 
target and limit reference points are summarized 
in Table 7. Model fit 3 is illustrated in Figure 3.
Good model fits were achieved that explained 
approximately 85% of the variance in the catch 
rates. However, great caution should be exercised 
when evaluating these preliminary results given 
the concerns expressed about the accuracy of 
the catch and effort data used to fit the model, 
the “one-way trip” of the data, and the difficulty in 
estimating K (Hilborn and Walters 1992).
Bearing these caveats in mind, the model predicts 
a maximum sustainable yield of 17,000 t with 
about 1300 boats (fMSY). The YMSY is significantly 
less than previous estimates for the multispecies 
assemblage, but more in line with the previous 
single-species estimates for tilapia. (see Habib 
2015) The estimate of fMSY is more consistent with 
some of the previous estimates, both single- and 
multispecies. These differences reflect differences 
in the datasets used and the model-fitting 
method. The model-fitting method used here 
does not make the unrealistic equilibrium and 
regression model assumptions used in previous 
assessments.
A PRELIMINARY STOCK ASSESSMENT: BIOMASS DYNAMICS MODEL
ssr 158.995 161.9 159.188 Units
Fit 1 Fit 2 Fit 3
r 0.44703 0.4537 0.4415 yr-1
K 150000 150000 150000 t
q 0.00017 0.00017 0.00016
B0 135000 127500 142500 T
IP 0.9 0.85 0.95
MSY 16763.6 17013.8 16556.3 t
EMSY 1318.02 1299.28 1346.04 boats
BMSY 75000 75000 75000 t
qMSY 0.00017 0.00017 0.00016 boat-1
FMSY 0.25298 0.25728 0.24942 yr-1
M 0.3 0.3 0.3 yr-1
Z MSY 0.55298 0.55728 0.54942 yr-1
Table 7. Estimates of alternative best-fitting biomass dynamics model for Lake Nasser fresh fish 
assemblage.
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The model suggests that catches from the fishery 
have exceeded YMSY (and therefore have been 
unsustainable) in 13 out of the past 34 years. 
Except in 2008, yields have been below YMSY 
for more than a decade, and now more than 
3000 licensed (and many unlicensed) boats are 
fishing—almost three times the effort required 
to achieve YMSY. This overexploitation, coupled 
with poor enforcement of mesh- and landing-
size restrictions and the closed season in recent 
years, has led to a significant decline in stock 
biomass, now predicted to be around 10% of 
the unexploited biomass B0. (See lower graph 
in Figure 3.) This is below the proportion (20%) 
considered necessary to avoid recruitment 
overfishing (Hoggarth et al. 2006). 
It is recommended that the model be re-fitted 
to this data using Yield software (Hoggarth et al. 
2006), which can provide estimates of uncertainty 
surrounding the estimated parameters and 
reference points. As part of this re-fitting process, 
consideration should also be given to exploring 
a wider parameter space, which was not possible 
here due to time constraints.
Figure 3. Biomass dynamics model fitted to the time series of catch and effort data for the fresh 
fish multispecies assemblage.
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Since its creation in the 1960s, Lake Nasser has 
supported important fisheries, mainly for tilapia, 
Nile perch and species of Alestes and Hydrocynus 
(tigerfish). The resources are exploited using 
gillnets, trammel nets and long lines set from 
small boats. After the lake filled, landings have 
varied from approximately 34,000 t in 1981 to 
about 8000 t in 2000. Recent landings have 
been in the order of 14,000 –19,000 t. In 2005, 
the estimated value of the fishery (including 
both fresh and salted fish) was around USD 17 
million. The fishery provides livelihoods for more 
than 13,000 fishers and an unknown number of 
livelihoods in supporting sectors.
Access to the fishery is controlled by a fishing 
company and cooperatives, and by the fishing 
authority (GAFRD) responsible for issuing fishing 
boat and fisher licenses. However, there appears 
to be no cap on the number of licenses that 
can be issued, and many boats operate without 
a license because of the limited capacity of 
GAFRD to monitor and control the fishery.
Due to the remoteness of most fishing areas 
and the lack of road and market infrastructure, 
most landings are purchased and gathered from 
fishing camps by carrier boats, operated by the 
fishing company Misr Aswan and formerly also 
by the cooperatives. This created opportunities 
for these organizations to control the price paid 
to fishers for their fish. The private sector has 
more recently been granted access to purchase 
fish from fishers at free market prices. Fishers 
now sell a proportion of their landings to the 
private sector, but fishers in the area controlled 
by Misr Aswan are constrained by obligations to 
sell at least part of their catch to the company, 
as it grants them access rights to the resource. 
While it was considered a legal requirement to 
land all fish through the three official harbors, 
allowing the management authority to monitor 
catches from the lake, compliance is low and 
hence a proportion of landings are unreported. 
This proportion is unknown but anecdotes 
suggest it could be significant.
Landings of fish at Aswan harbor may 
be processed (filleted and frozen) before 
distribution locally and to major cities, including 
Cairo. The main processing facility is owned by 
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Misr Aswan, but it now operates below capacity, 
as more of the catch is purchased by the private 
sector and transported directly to markets in 
Cairo and elsewhere or processed by private 
sector companies.
While no management plans have been 
prepared for the fishery, attempts have been 
made to control the harvesting of small-sized 
and spawning fish using technical measures: 
minimum mesh and fish-landing sizes, along 
with a 1-month closed season corresponding 
to the main spawning period of tilapia. These 
technical measures were apparently based 
upon stock assessments that were undertaken 
more than 17 years ago.
No apparent attempt has been made to control 
the number of boats or fishers in the fishery by 
licensing, in spite of attempts to estimate the 
number of boats corresponding to maximum 
sustainable yield (YMSY) as part of these early 
stock assessments. However, the majority 
of these earlier assessments appeared to be 
preoccupied with estimating potential and 
maximum yield from the fishery rather than 
target and limit reference points that could be 
used to help control and sustain the fishery. 
Unfortunately, these earlier estimates of YMSY 
and fMSY are likely to have been overly optimistic 
because of the model assumptions and fitting 
procedures applied.
Compliance with these technical measures has 
been poor, particularly in the past 4–5 years 
following the transfer of management authority 
from the HDLDA to GAFRD. Lack of resources 
and respect for GAFRD have been cited as the 
main reasons for this poor compliance.
In response to growing fishing effort (number of 
boats) and poor compliance with the technical 
measures, yield from the fishery has declined 
with significant interannual variation. Since 
1981, catch rates have declined by about 80% in 
a manner symptomatic of unsustainable rates of 
exploitation. All stakeholders consulted reported 
declining catch rates, fish size, and in some cases, 
a decline in the relative abundance of the largest 
species of tilapia (O. niloticus). Local GAFRD staff 
described the situation as “disastrous.”
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Based upon an assessment using an updated 
time series of catch and effort data, the 
maximum yield (YMSY) and corresponding fishing 
effort (fMSY) for fresh fish (mainly tilapia and 
Nile perch) have been re-estimated using more 
up-to-date models and fitting procedures. The 
results suggest that the maximum yield (about 
17,000 t) is significantly less than previous 
estimates for the multispecies assemblage, but 
more in line with the previous single-species 
estimates for tilapia. This yield would be taken 
by just 1300 boats (fMSY)—less than half the 
number now operating. Catches from the fishery 
exceeded YMSY in 13 out of the past 34 years. The 
stock biomass is predicted to be now around 
10% of the unexploited biomass B0. This is below 
the proportion (20%) considered necessary to 
avoid recruitment overfishing.
It is recommended that a management plan 
be formulated with the full participation 
of all stakeholders. The plan should first 
seek to rebuild the fish stocks of the lake to 
sustainable levels, at least above 0.2B0, and 
ideally to the biomass corresponding to 
maximum sustainable yield BMSY, or above if a 
precautionary approach is to be adopted.
This plan should be based upon an updated 
stock assessment and should seek to contain all 
of the information listed on page 23 as necessary 
to management plans. Most importantly, it 
should contain explicit decision-control rules 
describing what action should be taken in 
response to changes in indicators in relation to 
agreed target and limit reference points.
Management measures for the fishery should 
also be selected in consultation with key 
stakeholders to ensure that they can be 
monitored and enforced and are acceptable. 
It is recommended that both controls over 
fishing effort (number of boats licensed) and 
technical measures be included as part of 
the management strategy. The management 
strategy should be clearly described in the plan. 
It may be necessary to draft new legislation in 
support of new management measures.
Given the apparent status of the resource, it 
will be necessary to reduce fishing mortality 
(F). This can be achieved by a combination of a 
reduction in the number of boats fishing and 
technical measures. It is recommended that no 
further licenses be issued and consideration 
be given to reducing the number of boat (and 
fisher) licenses on an annual basis. The rate of 
effort removal could be advised on the basis of 
the biomass dynamics model described here 
but might be in the order of 10% per annum 
over a 5-year period.
A stock assessment based upon an analytical 
YPR analysis could help to guide the selection 
of minimum net-mesh or fish-landing sizes, as 
well as timing and duration of closed seasons, 
to provide adequate protection of spawning 
stocks and to minimize growth overfishing. 
The results of single-species assessments 
could be combined to provide multispecies 
guidance following appropriate species 
weighting. This would require sampling the 
main fish populations for their current size or 
age structure. An appropriate sampling design 
would need to be prepared.
The biomass dynamics model described on 
pages 30–31 should also be refitted using 
software (e.g. Yield) that is capable of providing 
estimates of uncertainty around the model 
parameter estimates. Projections of the 
response of the fishery to reductions in effort 
(number of boats) could be made to help 
guide an appropriate annual rate of reduction 
in boat licenses. The effects of lake levels on 
the fish dynamics should also be examined 
with appropriate models and accounted for if 
necessary in future assessments.
Improvements to the monitoring of the fishery 
will be key for the success of the management 
plan. Given the lack of incentives for fishers to 
land their catches through the official harbor 
channels, an alternative catch monitoring 
system should be designed.
This might take the form of a catch assessment 
survey, where catch rates of individual fishers 
are sampled monthly and raised by appropriate 
measures of effort, such as the number of active 
vessels, to give an estimate of catch for the lake. 
Sampling can be stratified by species, gear, and 
fishing area or zone. This type of survey requires 
resources, capacity and commitment. 
An alternative option would be self-monitoring 
by the fishers. In this case, fishers use a logbook 
to record daily—or during certain days of the 
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month—their catch rates by species and gear 
type in return for some benefit such as access 
to the resource (fishing licenses) or money. 
Regular checks by the management authority 
would be necessary to control under-reporting, 
particularly if tax payments remain dependent 
upon the annual catch weight. This logbook 
approach has been applied successfully in the 
lower Mekong Basin (Halls et al. 2013). Involving 
fishers in the monitoring process gives fishers 
a sense of involvement in, and responsibility 
for, the management of the lake. They are 
therefore more likely to comply with new 
measures. It allows them to monitor the effect 
of management for themselves. This may be 
very important where reductions in their fishing 
effort will be necessary to rebuild the fish stocks 
of the lake.
In addition to catch, the age or size structure of 
fish populations should be routinely monitored 
to provide estimates of the fishing mortality 
rate, F. These estimates should be monitored 
against the target and limit reference points 
generated from the analytical YPR assessment 
and should form the basis of decision-control 
rules. An appropriate sampling program should 
be designed with samples taken either from 
fisher landings and adjusted for gear selectivity, 
or more simply using fishery-independent 
surveys using nonselective gear types or fleets 
of multi-mesh-size gillnets. 
The management authority will need to 
improve compliance with any new rules and 
regulations introduced under the management 
plan. Sufficient resources (staff, boats, funds, 
etc.) should be allocated to the authority 
for the purposes of monitoring, control and 
surveillance, perhaps funded from license 
revenue or from the current tax on landings.
Regular reviews of the management plan 
should take place with the full participation of 
all key stakeholders, and the decision-control 
rules should be followed rigorously. Stock 
assessments should be updated annually. 
While capacity for stock assessment is currently 
lacking, opportunities exist to rebuild this 
capacity.
On the basis of the stakeholder consultations, 
there appears to be strong support for the 
creation of a co-management organization 
comprising representatives of the main 
stakeholders, including fishers. This opportunity 
should be supported and encouraged. A key 
first task of this organization would be to agree 
on stakeholder roles and responsibilities for 
management based upon their respective 
roles and responsibilities. Indeed, this process 
should be undertaken prior to the formulation 
of the management plan, to ensure that 
relevant stakeholders have an active role in the 
formulation of the plan. 
Other recommendations
It appears that the current system of property 
and access rights is largely responsible for 
under-reporting of catches and the disposal of 
fish via unofficial channels. Consideration might 
therefore be given to removing the control 
rights of the fishing company and cooperatives 
but maintaining the currently recognized access 
rights of fishers to their historic fishing grounds.
As a means to improve the monitoring of the 
fishery, consideration might also be given to 
changing the existing tax laws that are based 
upon fishers’ reported catch, giving fishers a 
strong disincentive to report their true catch.
The effectiveness of stock enhancement should 
be examined to avoid unnecessary expenditure 
on potentially ineffective programs.
Interest in developing national and export 
markets for tilapia and Nile perch was expressed 
by some fish processors. These opportunities 
should be explored further and developed if 
potential exists.
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ANNEX 1. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, PERSONS MET 
AND KEY FINDINGS 
Date Description of activities, persons met and key findings
5 May 2015 Literature review.
6 May 2015 Literature review.
7 May 2015 Literature review and travel to Cairo.
8 May 2015 Arrive Cairo 04:00.
Preparation of report.
Kick-off meeting with Malcolm Dickson.
9 May 2015 Meeting with Malcolm Dickson and Ahmed Nasr-Allah at WorldFish to discuss mission terms of reference, scope 
and review activities. Assembly of relevant literature and datasets.
10 May 2015 Travel to Aswan. Briefing meeting with Dr. Olfat Anwar. Review and revision of mission schedule. Visit to fisher/fish 
processor producing mainly salted tigerfish. Preparations for stakeholder consultation workshop. Reporting.
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Date Description of activities, persons met and key findings
11 May 2015 Visit to Aswan Harbor. Met by Mr. Tag El Dein Abu El Rahman, Director of the HDLDA. Observed three carrier boats 
landing catch to refrigerated transport. Species included tilapia, Nile perch, marmoryds, electric fish, catfish. Most 
tilapia were small size and below the minimum landing size (500 g).
However, landings and sales of these undersized fish appeared to be permitted under the auspices of the HDLDA. 
Some large individual fish also present, particularly Nile perch. Some salted (tigerfish) also landed by fishers. 
Landing records appeared comprehensive and transportation licenses were also being issued. Plenty of ice present 
and hygiene standards appeared reasonable but below international standards. No GAFRD staff present. Reported 
that up to 15 t of fish are landed daily by carrier boats and up to 12 t by pickup truck. The latter tend to arrive in the 
afternoon packed in boxes with ice and covered with a blanket. Four research vessels owned by the HDLDA were 
moored in the harbor. Reported to be operational but not used for fisheries research since 2009.
Visit to Misr Aswan Fishing Company. Mr. Osama Mohammed Kamel, Chief of Sector. State-owned processing 
company. Previously handling up to 1000 t per week during peak fishing period, employing 300 full-time and 
1000 part-time staff. Volume has reduced significantly as fishers now land directly to traders at unofficial locations 
around the lake. These landings therefore are unreported.
Visit to Aswan Dam and High Dam Authority of the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation to request 
hydrological data for the lake. Official letter of request from WorldFish was required. Olfat to arrange.
Meeting with Dr. Nazeh Naguib and Dr. Ishack Agaypi at NIOF. Presently, NIOF monitors lake chemistry, sediments, 
water quality and benthic fauna. No fisheries monitoring is undertaken, and since 1999, following the retirement 
of Dr. Azem, the Aswan branch of the institute has no fisheries specialists and therefore no capacity to advise the 
management authority with respect to fisheries management and stock assessment.
However, significant capacity in fisheries biology and stock assessment does exist at the Alexandria and Cairo 
branches of NIOF. Competent staff from these branches could be transferred permanently or temporarily to Aswan 
to support the management authority.
These opportunities should be discussed with Dr. Azza-El-Ganayni, Head, Fishery Department, NIOF  
(Tel: 01063768894).
It was reported that the FMC of the HDLDA still exists but also no longer has any significant capacity to provide 
advice with respect to fisheries management. Currently, the FMC advises only on aquaculture and environmental 
matters.
Meeting with Mahmoud Hasseb, Executive Director, GAFRD. GAFRD is now the main management authority/
institution responsible for issuing fishing licenses, enforcing rules and monitoring the fishery to maximize fish 
production. Significantly, the current management situation was reported to be “disastrous.” The fishery was 
reported to be overexploited and GAFRD lacks capacity to monitor and control the fishery. Reported having 
40 members of staff (2–3 stationed at each harbor, 8 involved in monitoring, control and surveillance, and the 
remainder involved in administration at headquarters) and a budget of EGP 400,000 (USD 57,000) per annum. He 
has five small patrol boats all based in Aswan. He needs a larger boat to make extended trips (1 week) over the 
whole lake to improve enforcement coverage. He estimated he needs twice his current budget to carry out his 
mandate.
Both GAFRD and the HDLDA collect catch data but he regards GAFRD data to be more reliable because he 
claims that the HDLDA does not record landings from carrier boats of less than 200 kilograms (kg). Furthermore 
GAFRD receives records of collected catch from carrier boats for validation of their own observations. HDLDA 
statistics only report catches landed via the official harbors. GAFRD appears to make ad hoc corrections to 
account for unreported landings made via unofficial landing sites. However, GAFRD could not provide supporting 
documentation or explanation of these correction factors. It appears that GAFRD has “manipulated” landings 
statistics to indicate improving management performance. The Director admitted that the management situation 
was “disastrous.”
It was evident from discussions with GAFRD that it has no clear management objectives nor management plan, no 
fisheries management system in place, little understanding of fisheries management, and no or little knowledge 
or experience of stock assessment and its role in management. Hence GAFRD appears to be struggling to manage 
the fishery effectively.
The need for major support and advice was acknowledged and significant interest was expressed in a project 
to formulate and implement a management plan, based upon an updated stock assessment and following 
consultations with key stakeholders, and to build management capacity. The project should include problem 
identification, training in fisheries management and stock assessment, and building capacity to monitor and 
control the fishery. The Director expressed his wish to support and cooperate with such a project. See below for 
further details of the responses to questions.
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Date Description of activities, persons met and key findings
12 May 2015 Meeting with Dr. Hussein Amar Adam and Mr. Murad Zaki Agaybi, formerly fisheries biologists and stock 
assessment scientists at the HDLDA, FMC until 2011 and 2 weeks ago respectively. Until 2011, when management 
responsibility for the lake’s fisheries resources was passed to GAFRD, the FMC provided scientific and technical 
advice to support the management of the lake’s resources by the HDLDA. By 2011, its staff had gained 20 years’ 
experience in fisheries biology, stock assessment and management, including overseas training. Its proposed 
management measures (minimum mesh sizes, minimum landing sizes and a closed season) provided the technical 
and scientific basis for the management of the lake’s resources. It estimated potential yields from the lake and also 
target and limit reference points based upon surplus production and analytical (YPR) models.
Since 2011, GAFRD has attempted to manage the fish resources of the lake with very little or no technical capacity 
or knowledge in fisheries management and stock assessment. (See above.)
While the FMC still exists, it no longer employs any staff with experience or expertise in fisheries management 
and assessment. Furthermore, bitter rivalry appears to exist between GAFRD and the HDLDA after the former was 
assigned responsibility for management in 2011. Each blames the other for the apparent management failures. 
The former FMC employees consulted agreed that the FMC and GAFRD should work together, sharing 
responsibility for management based upon their respective strengths and stakes in the fishery. This has already 
been advocated to the Aswan Governorate by Dr. Adam in November 2014 but without apparent reaction. The 
FMC has suggested that this collaboration should also be advocated to the Minister for Agriculture.
To improve fisheries monitoring, it was agreed that it was first imperative to gain a better understanding of 
fisher behavior, including the disposal (movement) of fish after capture. It would appear that currently there is 
little understanding of these pathways. If fishers retain or sort their catch in any way, then landings and effort 
reported by carrier boats at harbors cannot be relied upon to monitor catch and effort, or the size structure of the 
population required to estimate rates of exploitation.
Further research is therefore necessary to determine these pathways. If fishers are retaining part of their catch, or 
if a significant proportion of fishers are selling their catch directly to markets or via unofficial landing sites, it will 
be necessary to design a catch assessment survey to estimate catch, effort and CPUE from direct observations of 
fisher landings supported by a frame survey to provide sample raising factors (total number of boats, boat activity 
coefficients, days fishing per month, etc.).
Similarly, it will be necessary to design appropriate programs to sample whole, unsorted landings of fishers to 
provide unbiased estimates of the size and age structure of the population and therefore rates of exploitation 
(after accounting for gear selectivity) and other biological parameters. 
Following discussions with the ex-FMC scientists, it was agreed that future monitoring programs should seek to 
provide estimates of the size and age structure of the main species exploited, together with catch by species and 
effort by gear type (and boat). Scale-reading equipment to estimate fish age already exists at the FMC.
This would allow for the monitoring of the following key indicators of management performance: Yield (Y), 
fishing effort (f), and annual instantaneous rate of fishing mortality (F) in relation to the following target and 
limit reference points: YMSY, fMSY, Fmax, F0.1, F20%SPR, derived from (i) a biomass dynamics model fitted to estimates of 
annual catch and effort (and accounting for environmental effects; e.g. lake level or shoreline length) and (ii) an 
equilibrium YPR; and an equilibrium spawning stock biomass (SSB)-per-recruit model for each major target species 
estimated from intermediate model parameters (growth, mortality, age at first capture, gear selectivity, age at 
maturity, etc.). Consideration might also be given to estimating their multispecies analogues. Monitoring reliable 
estimates of CPUE and effort by species should also be undertaken at a minimum.
Using the guidance produced by these models, the lake could then be managed using a precautionary approach 
by controlling fishing effort (number of boats) via the licensing system and/or net-mesh size and closed seasons to 
achieve high/maximum yields without compromising the sustainability (reproductive capacity) of the stock. 
The former FMC scientists suggested that estimating the age structure of populations of each species would 
require 300–400 scale samples per year per species and 100–200 length samples per month per species. Gear 
selectivity studies (curves/ogives) would also need to be updated. 
Reporting.
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Date Description of activities, persons met and key findings
13 May 2015 Stakeholder consultation workshop: 20 participants from GAFRD, fisher cooperatives, Egyptian Environmental 
Affairs Agency (EEAA), CARE, fishers, fishing companies and processors. Began with a short presentation outlining 
the objectives and purpose of the project, observed trends in the fishery, reports of stakeholders to date, and 
purpose of the consultation with a series of questions for discussion. (See Stakeholder Consultation Workshop 
Report [Annex 3] for more details.) Each stakeholder responded to the five main discussion topics. One stakeholder 
(Mr. Kamel Ebrahim Bekhit, Vice Chair, Mother Cooperative Society) reported his frustration with the many 
meetings and workshops that have been held in the past but without any subsequent action. The main findings 
and conclusions follow. There was a consensus that the lake fisheries are in a poor state. They are overexploited, 
and illegal fishing gears and practices are used by fishers. The closed season is no longer respected or observed. 
Landings via unofficial channels are common. Fishers have little incentive to comply with existing measures since 
enforcement is weak and there are no or insignificant sanctions for noncompliance. GAFRD has few resources 
to monitor and no longer has access to boats and equipment available to the previous management authority 
(HDLDA).
Stakeholders agreed that they need to act collectively and share the responsibility for management to rebuild 
the stocks. Exactly what their respective roles should be requires further discussion and careful consideration, 
accounting for stakeholder capacity and interest. The idea of the creation of a co-management organization or 
body, and to co-formulate and implement a revised management plan on the basis of improved scientific advice, 
was strongly supported. Cooperation between all stakeholders would be required for effective management. 
It was suggested that fishers should play their part of monitoring and reporting illegal fishing practices and 
activities. Perhaps radically, it was also suggested that ice should not be supplied to fishers during the closed 
season to discourage them from fishing during this period. 
There was also consensus that management should be guided by scientific advice, which is currently lacking. 
It was furthermore agreed that the management measures (closed seasons, minimum mesh and landing sizes) 
should be applied. It was also acknowledged that existing measures may not be appropriate now given the 
observed shifts in species composition towards smaller species of tilapia (zillii and galilaeus) and therefore 
measures should be reviewed and revised on the basis of scientific advice. Furthermore, while generally supported 
by most stakeholders, the economic consequences of a closed season should be considered. Sanctions for 
noncompliance must form the basis of a strengthened policy towards illegal fishing. Awareness-raising among 
fishers of the purpose of management measures is required to encourage greater compliance. Controls over the 
sale of illegal mesh-size gears should be introduced. Enclosures and stock enhancement might also be considered. 
Processors require facilities to process large Nile perch. EEAA dismissed claims that crocodiles were impacting fish 
stocks. Crocodile abundance in the lake is declining rapidly. Crocodile farming was proposed as a means to protect 
the wild population and to support alternative livelihoods.
If fishers continue to land their catch via unofficial channels because it is less costly, more profitable and/or more 
convenient, then existing attempts to census landings at the three main harbors to monitor catch may have to 
be replaced with a monthly, sample-based catch assessment survey supported by an annual or bi-annual frame 
survey. A catch assessment survey would provide more detailed information about fishing activities and effort 
for improving scientific advice, as well as a further means of monitoring compliance with rules and regulations, 
and could help to maintain regular communication between the management authority and fishers. License fee 
revenues might provide a potential source of funding for this survey.
Significantly, it was reported that the price of fish landed from Lake Nasser can be lower in Cairo compared to 
Aswan. This might suggest that traders and processors operating through official channels are making above-
normal profit from the sale of fish. 
14 May 2015 Reporting.
15 May 2015 Reporting.
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16 May 2015 Visit to Lake Nasser to consult fishers. Three camps visited: all located in Misr Aswan Company Fishing Zone in the far 
north of the lake.
Camp 1: Fishing since 1982; based at camp for most of year except for vacations (2 months/year). Permanent home 
in Sohag. Use gillnets and trammel nets. Nets soak for 12–24 hours/day. Mainly drift netting for tilapia, Nile perch, 
tigerfish. No labeo. Three fishers based at camp each with a boat. Boat licenses are issued by GAFRD resembling a 
credit card with logo and barcode prepared in Cairo. Fishers are also required to hold a fishing license. Fish are landed 
and stored in plastic boxes with ice. Carrier boat collects catch from camp two to three times per week. Fishers paid 
immediately or when carrier boat returns. Fishers not happy with price paid by fishing company. Prices given are 
significantly lower than offered by private carrier boat operators. However, they feel obliged to sell their catch to the 
company, otherwise it threatens not to issue a letter (from fishing companies and cooperatives) required by GAFRD 
to accompany boat license renewal applications. This letter contains details of the fisher, his fishing zone and his total 
catch in the previous year. Tax must be paid by fishers if their annual catch exceeds 5 t as reported in a letter to the tax 
office by his fishing company or cooperative. Fishers seek to avoid paying this tax by ensuring that they sell less than 
5 t to their company or cooperative. The remainder they sell to private carrier boats or land to other traders on the 
lakeshore. These private carrier boat operators then claim to the harbor authorities that they have caught the fish they 
are landing. However, if fishers do not sell to the fishing company, they are reported to the aquatic police. Fishers are 
unsure if they are required by law to sell their catch to fishing companies or cooperatives. Hence it appears that the 
companies and cooperatives are still attempting to control the price paid for fish bought from fishers operating in their 
zones. The fisher consulted reported that the fishery has never been managed with catch quotas. Aware of mesh-size 
regulations and minimum landing size, but reported that the fishing company accepts 250-g fish. Also aware of closed 
season but nobody has complied with this regulation for several years.
Many unlicensed boats are operating, often belonging to fishers currently holding valid boat and fishing licenses. 
Stocks are reported to be declining because there are too many fishers. Also decline in fish size observed. Decline in the 
relative abundance of O. niloticus reported. Most fishers catch between 3 and 5 t of fish per annum. Management efforts 
should be directed at controlling the number of unlicensed boats and illegal fishing activities. 
Fisher reported being interested in participating in some form of co-management. Expressed the wish to be consulted 
regarding management decisions and would be interested to represent other fishers in a co-management body or 
organization.
Camp 2: Fishing for 12 years using gillnet, trammel nets and long line for Nile perch. Status of fishery reported to be very 
poor. Low fish abundance, particularly during the past 2 years. More licensed boats operating now. More licenses issued 
each year by GAFRD. Operates three boats with engines and three without engines. Catches approximately 7–10 kg/
boat/day. Sells 70% of his catch to a private boat owner/trader in return for cash and supplies. Unlike fishing company, 
private traders purchase fish of all sizes, including undersize fish. Therefore, private traders appear to be supporting the 
capture of undersize fish. Would choose to sell all of his catch to private traders but would be reported to the aquatic 
police by fishing company. Reported not to have changed his net-mesh size. GAFRD last visited his camp 2–3 years ago. 
Don’t appear very active and preoccupied with “smuggling boats.” Management could be improved by redistributing 
the total shoreline in a more equitable manner. 
All boat license holders operate within their own fishing areas (linked to their boat license), which have remained 
unchanged since the fishing companies and cooperatives were established. By law, fishers have exclusive rights to fish 
these areas and exclude others. Can sell/transfer boat license (with fishing area). Current boat license holders can apply 
for any number of additional boat licenses and often fish additional boats without licenses. Would be interested in more 
active participation in management and be better represented in decision-making. These fishing areas (n=79?) could 
provide relevant spatial units for co-management.
Camp 3: Boat license holder associated with this camp for 30 years. Fishes with typical gears. Reports no change in 
relative species abundance but overall catch rates have declined from 20–30 kg/boat/day to 5–15 kg/boat/day. Many 
more boats operating now and closed season is not enforced. Closed season has not been observed for 4–5 years. 
Often catches mouth-brooding fish. Mean size of fish has declined significantly. Most new boats joining the fishery 
belong to existing boat license holders. Estimated that the number of unlicensed boats is similar to the number of 
licensed boats. The number of unlicensed boats has increased significantly during the past 5–6 years. Prior to that, most 
boats were licensed. Management could be improved by dissolving cooperatives, stock enhancement, introducing 
pensions and credit for fishers, enforcing the closed season, and re-distributing the fishing grounds in a more equitable 
manner. Fishing area varies greatly among fishers.
17 May 2015 Reporting.
18 May 2015 Reporting.
19 May 2015 Preparation of presentation.
20 May 2015 Travel to Cairo.
Mission report presentation.
21 May 2015 Travel to United Kingdom.
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Date Name Occupation or position Organization, institution or business name
10 May 2015 Esmail Hagage Abd El Allah Fisher and fish processor None
No. Question Response
1. What trends or changes have 
you observed in the fishery?
1960–1990 fishery well managed. Management problems began when 
inexperienced GAFRD was given responsibility for management. Since 2011 
about 50% of fishers have left the fishery due to declining catch rates and yield.
Small decrease in licensed vessels but unlicensed boats have increased by 
approximately 30%. Use of outboard engines has increased. Fewer full-time 
fishers, more part time with few other livelihood opportunities. This year, 
number of fishers has declined significantly due to decline in catch rates.
2. What is the current status 
and health of the fishery 
(underexploited; fully exploited; 
overexploited)?
Overexploited due to poor management and lack of enforcement of rules and 
regulations.
3. What are the main problems, 
issues and weaknesses of the 
fishery? 
Fishers have no trust or confidence in management or respect for current 
management authority.
4. What are the main threats faced 
by the fishery?
5. What are the good things about 
the fishery (i.e. its strengths and 
benefits)?
6. Is the fishery well managed? If 
not, why not?
No. GAFRD lacks management experience. No stock enhancement since 2011.
7. How could the management be 
improved?
More scientific advice and enforcement of rules. Provide a forum for listening to 
the views of fishers and processors and to exchange ideas.
8. Are control measures (rules and 
regulations) effectively (well) 
enforced? If not, why not?
No, and even compliant fishers are sometimes sanctioned. GAFRD has few staff, 
morale is low, relations between GAFRD and fishers are poor.
9. Should the fishery be controlled 
by restrictions of catch or 
fishing effort, by technical 
measures, or by a combination?
Stock enhancement, enforcement of minimum landing size, closed season.
10. What roles and responsibilities 
should or could stakeholders 
have in management (e.g.  
rule-making, monitoring, 
decision-making, enforcement, 
control, etc.)?
Cooperative should support fishers, provide training and education in fisheries 
management, and explain reasons for rules and regulations in the context of 
sustainability. Management authority should listen to the views of the fisher 
community.
Fishers don’t have the capacity to manage on their own but should participate in 
decision-making.
11. What opportunities exist for 
the fishery (e.g. development 
of the Nile perch fishery, 
developing export markets, 
stock enhancement, added 
value, etc.)?
With good management, yields will increase. Development of export markets in 
Europe for tilapia and Nile perch.
Consider creating more enclosures.
12. How much of the catch is 
landed at the main harbors (the 
official landing sites)?
75%–80%. Most of the remainder sold directly to traders but this then passes 
through the harbors. About 5% is sold directly in markets by fishers.
13. Complete the following fish 
disposal pathway diagram. 
14. How could monitoring of the 
fishery be improved?
All catch should pass (be registered) through main harbor markets. Enforce 
issuance of transport licenses for cars. This would ensure all catch is monitored 
and carrier boats will then return. Fishers can sell to any carrier boat, therefore 
competitive market exists. All vessels should be licensed with permanent vessel 
serial number. Regular monitoring of boat licenses.
15. Other comments.
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Date Name Occupation or position Organization, institution or business name
11 May 2015 Mr. Osama
Mohammed
Kamel
Chief of Sector Misr Aswan Fishing Company
No. Question Response
1. What trends or changes have 
you observed in the fishery?
Yield and mean size of fish have declined. The proportion of tilapia in the catch 
has declined from approximately 90% to 70% and been replaced by Hydrocynus 
and Alestes. Nile perch formed about 10% of landings, now 5%. Increasing use 
of outboard engines. Fewer full-time fishers. Fishers are more opportunistic 
and tend to be part time. Fishers increasingly landing to unofficial sites to 
avoid paying harbor-related taxes, to land undersized fish and to receive cash 
payments for their catch. Landings are being transported to Cairo via collection 
and trade depots, including in Esna (160 kilometers [km] from Aswan).
2. What is the current status 
and health of the fishery 
(underexploited; fully exploited; 
overexploited)?
Overexploited.
3. What are the main problems, 
issues and weaknesses of the 
fishery? 
Overfishing, poor enforcement of rules and regulations, landings at unofficial 
landing sites, predation by crocodiles, no stock enhancement, increasing use of 
small mesh gears. Landings no longer inspected for diseases and parasites.
4. What are the main threats faced 
by the fishery?
GAFRD is issuing fish transportation licenses to traders on request without 
inspecting catch to monitor catch weights and fish size. Traders under-report 
(catch) weights to be transported. 
5. What are the good things about 
the fishery (i.e. its strengths and 
benefits)?
Fishery provides important source of animal protein and supporting industries, 
including processors, employing many staff. 
6. Is the fishery well managed? If 
not, why not?
GAFRD has limited management capacity.
7. How could the management be 
improved?
A committee should be established to include the management authority, 
scientists, fishers, processors and other stakeholders to improve management. 
The FMC should be strengthened.
8. Are control measures (rules and 
regulations) effectively (well) 
enforced? If not, why not?
Poor enforcement of rules because GAFRD lacks technical capacity, staff, boats 
and resources. When the HDLDA was managing, compliance with rules was 
high because the HDLDA had capacity and scientific knowledge to manage the 
fishery effectively.
9. Should the fishery be controlled 
by restrictions of catch or 
fishing effort, by technical 
measures, or by a combination?
By closed season, mesh regulations, landing size and effort restrictions (limit 
fishing licenses). 
10. What roles and responsibilities 
should or could stakeholders 
have in management (e.g.  
rule-making, monitoring, 
decision-making, enforcement, 
control, etc.)?
See 7.
11. What opportunities exist for 
the fishery (e.g. development 
of the Nile perch fishery, 
developing export markets, 
stock enhancement, added 
value, etc.)?
High-value export markets. 
12. How much of the catch is 
landed at the main harbors (the 
official landing sites)?
5%. (This estimate appears unlikely given the quantities observed to be landed.)
13. Complete the following fish 
disposal pathway diagram. 
14. How could monitoring of the 
fishery be improved?
Ensure that all landings pass through official channels (harbors) so that catch 
can be accurately enumerated.
15. Other comments. Crocodiles protected under the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES). Abundance unknown.
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Date Name Occupation or position Organization, institution or business name
10 May 2015 Mahmoud Hasseb Executive Director GAFRD
No. Question Response
1. What trends or changes have 
you observed in the fishery?
Declining catch rates, increasing number of small-sized fish being landed. 
Declines in abundance of O. niloticus, which now forms only about 25% of the 
catch. Approximately 70% of the catch is now below minimum legal landing size 
(500 g).
2. What is the current status 
and health of the fishery 
(underexploited; fully exploited; 
overexploited)?
Overexploited. Situation reported to be “disastrous.”
3. What are the main problems, 
issues and weaknesses of the 
fishery? 
Lack of resources to enforce rules and regulations and effectively monitor the 
fishery. 
4. What are the main threats faced 
by the fishery?
Cheap cultured fish from the Delta. Lake Nasser fisheries not price competitive.
Future development of aquaculture in the Suez Canal. 70 km2 has been 
proposed for aquaculture development. 
5. What are the good things about 
the fishery (i.e. its strengths and 
benefits)?
6. Is the fishery well managed? If 
not, why not?
No. 
7. How could the management be 
improved?
More resources and staff to enforce management rules.
8. Are control measures (rules and 
regulations) effectively (well) 
enforced? If not, why not?
No. About 80% of fishers operate illegal small-mesh nets. At least 500 unlicensed 
boats are operating. Long shoreline (7000 km) to patrol.
9. Should the fishery be controlled 
by restrictions of catch or 
fishing effort, by technical 
measures, or by a combination?
Reported that GAFRD licenses a maximum of 3100 boats based upon the 
shoreline length and a quota of shoreline length per boat. Appears arbitrary and 
not based upon previous fisheries stock assessments.
10. What roles and responsibilities 
should or could stakeholders 
have in management (e.g.  
rule-making, monitoring, 
decision-making, enforcement, 
control, etc.)?
Key stakeholders should be consulted about approach to management and 
scientists from NIOF could provide scientific advice. 
11. What opportunities exist for 
the fishery (e.g. development 
of the Nile perch fishery, 
developing export markets, 
stock enhancement, added 
value, etc.)?
Improved marketing of fish from Lake Nasser. Eco-labeling (certification).
12. How much of the catch is 
landed at the main harbors (the 
official landing sites)?
85%–90%. Unlicensed boats cannot land at harbors. Therefore only catches from 
licensed boats are recorded.
13. Complete the following fish 
disposal pathway diagram. 
14. How could monitoring of the 
fishery be improved?
Ensuring that all vessels land at harbors as required by law. Controlling the sale 
of undersized (illegal size) fish at harbors. Issuing of transport permits only after 
catch inspection for size and weight. Monitoring the few roads around the lake 
may be easier than monitoring all potential landing sites.  
15. Other comments.
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Introduction to the Youth Employment in Aswan Governorate (YEAG) Project
The donor for the YEAG project is the Government of Switzerland through the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC). The duration of the project is 3 years with a total sum of CHF 
5 million. Partners are CARE International in Egypt and WorldFish. The project aims to increase the 
income of 2500 individuals and to create up to 4000 employment opportunities for disadvantaged 
youth, men and women in Aswan. Through a market development approach, the project will 
focus on high-growth value chains in horticulture, livestock and fisheries and will aim to foster 
entrepreneurship.
Dr. Ashley Halls
Thank you for attending this consultation meeting. I am here to be informed about the current 
situation of Lake Nasser fisheries and to hear ideas to be applied to enhance lake fisheries.
The most important thing is to know your experiences and knowledge and how to improve the 
current situation. Through meetings I have participated in over the last few days, I get a feeling 
that the current situation is acceptable and there are good points we can build on to enhance the 
fisheries.
I have to emphasize that the aim of the meeting is to know your opinions and how to work 
together to improve lake management. I am not here to say what you should do and what you 
should not do; I am here to give you advice through the information I have and to answer your 
questions.
I have a short presentation to explain the information I have:
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Data collection on catch and number of boats shows that there is a distinction in the data. There 
is a regular increase in catch from 1966 to 1980, followed by a decline from 1980 to 1990, then an 
increase again from 1990 to 1995, to a low in 2000. Also, it is obvious that the number of boats is 
increasing with the decrease in catch.
If we draw a figure between catch and boat numbers, we can notice that when the number 
of boats increase, the catch will increase until a certain point and then the catch declines. In 
management science, we should reach the peak of catch without affecting the stock. The High 
Dam Lake Development Authority works to find modules for obtaining good fish production. 
Moreover, we noticed that there is a relation between catch, water level and fish behavior.
General remarks:
• Declining (decreasing) fish size is noted, which means that the fish are not living as long.
• There is a change in the species composition—a decrease in tilapia species and increase in 
tigerfish.
• Now, Nile tilapia represents only 25% of the total catch.
• The closed fishing season from the middle of April to the middle of May to maintain the stock 
has not been applied for the last few years (5 years).
• The use of illegal nets—about 80% (small mesh size)—has a bad effect on the stock.
• About 70% of tilapia catch are less than 500 g.
• Using more boats with motors to increase fish catch causes overfishing.
• We do not know the current situation of lake fisheries because we do not know the actual catch. 
This situation is not only here, but it is the same in other countries.
• GAFRD does not have enough equipment, facilities or budget. We should cooperate with GAFRD.
• Cooperation between the whole chain, from fisher, trader and processor to administration is a 
must.
• We have to put our hands together to improve this situation, set a plan, and then ask the 
government, management organizations and donors to apply it.
• We need cooperation and confidence to carry out the plan. 
Now we are going to ask everyone about his or her opinion, idea, etc. It is recommended to respect 
everyone who is talking and to not interrupt.
Mr. Dahab Aly Galal, Chairman of Aswan Sons Cooperative Society
From the valuable introduction and presentation, it seems that we should focus on fishing effort, 
which is affected by our behavior. This depends mainly on the administrative organization and 
the fishers themselves, who should cooperate and carry out the regulations. Recently, the lake 
has been suffering from lack of security. The lake should be secured, with law enforcement taking 
place, because there are lots of unlicensed boats, which put pressure on the resources—in other 
words, there is more fishing effort. Also, illegal methods of fishing are applied by electricity, gas and 
explosives. We hope to have a strong enforcement of laws and strong penalties. Each cooperative 
and each fishing camp should stick by the number of licenses or less than it.
Mr. Esmail Hagage, Chairman of independent syndicate for fishers
We need good communication from the fishers through the last chain of the management to solve 
the problems. We need science. We need to enforce laws.
Eng. Asraf Mohamed Bagdade, The Egyptian Fish Marketing Company
All the development depends on the fishers, so we should increase their awareness (through 
teaching) of the influence of using illegal nets and the bad effect of fishing small-sized fish and 
how to maintain their fishing grounds to obtain the highest fish production. Apply effective law 
enforcement to stop smuggling of fish. Apply a closed fishing season during the spawning season 
of fish.
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Mr. Badawe Mohran El Sayed, Fisher, trader and processor
There has been no closed fishing season since 1970 and no bad effect on the fish catch was 
noticed. I have 27 licenses but operate only 15 boats to catch large fish only, but other fishers apply 
illegal fishing methods, which in turn affects me. The cooperatives, authorities and security should 
work together and take severe action against fishers who do not follow the rules and regulations.
Mr. Nabil Mansour Tayah, Member of Aswan Sons Cooperative Society
I support the effective closed fishing season. The number of crocodiles is increasing; if it is 
permitted to catch them, the fish catch will increase because they consume a huge amount of fish.
Mr. Gamal Abdo Hassoun, Director of Nubian Coop
To begin with, I would like to thank Dr. Ashley. Governmental support is needed. Through the 
technical committee, the closed season was discussed, but it was found that we need EGP 1–3 
million to apply it. The plan for lake management exists but the cost is high; we are ready to carry 
out the plan.
There is a need for scientific guidance, such as from the FMC or NIOF. There was a problem during 
the 1990s (fish were having an unusual smell), but no one could explain to us the reason for it. After 
a long time, we knew it was due to a type of aquatic plant.
Mr. Esam Abd El Nasser Hassen, Member of Nubian Coop
Thanks to Dr. Ashley. The main target is carrying out the plans. The problem is how to reach a 
secure point for fishing without having overfishing or overexploited stocks. We were depending 
on the flood season to bring fry, but with overfishing the number of fish declined and in turn 
the number of fry decreased too. There is a concern about restocking with fry; the number is not 
sufficient and they are released in certain places only. Natural enclosures were applied in certain 
places only, but these should be applied on the whole lake. The fishers are catching the small-sized 
fish because of its price; for example, the price inside the lake is 150–250 piasters, but it is sold out 
of the lake for EGP 15. We need a wholesale market in Aswan, like El Obour market in Cairo. Also, 
we would like to process lake fish and export it. New technology is needed to catch the big fish like 
Nile perch. The way to stop using the illegal nets is to stop importing them.
Mr. Waeel Abd El Hamaed, Trader of salted fish
Enforce the law to eliminate the illegal nets. 
Mr. Tawfik Abdel Fatah, Chairman of El Takamol Coop
The problem of crocodiles is the most important, and we should find a way to reduce their number. 
Nowadays, they reach 4–5 meters, and one crocodile can consume 50 kg/day. It is advisable to 
enforce laws effectively to stop using illegal nets to catch small-sized fish. Stop selling the illegal 
fishing gear.
Mr. Kamal Ebrahim Bekheit, Vice Chairman of Mother Coop
We welcome Dr. Ashley and thank the donor. A few years ago, Nile tilapia made up about 90% of 
catch, but nowadays small-sized tilapia represents about 70%. That means that illegal fishing is 
increasing to catch tilapia that is less than 500 g. Most of the catch is O. galilaeus and Tilapia zillii, 
which become mature at the small size of 150–200 g. We would like to have a focus study on Nile 
tilapia through a scientific institute such as the FMC or others to develop and culture pure tilapia, 
so that it will once more predominate the catch by 90%.
Ms. Basma Mostafa Abbas, Environment awareness, EEAA
There is no cooperation between the administration organizations. Law enforcement is not applied 
effectively to stop smuggling. Lake Nasser fish is selling in Cairo cheaper than in Aswan. Crocodiles 
are not the main factor for catch declining. We have to study other factors that have impact on the 
fish catch, such as off-shore cultivation, because it could be using illegal pesticides or fertilizer.
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Dr. Mohamed Ezzat, Crocodiles unit, EEAA
First of all I would like to clarify the effect of crocodiles on the fish catch. Scientifically, there is 
no effect of crocodiles, which we have been monitoring since 2008. I have a 10-day survey on a 
regular monthly basis, and the number is decreasing; for instance, in Khor El Ramla the number 
of crocodiles was 100 in 2008, after 2 years the number became 50, and last year the number was 
only 20. There is no specific study about how much a crocodile consumes per day, but when we 
dissected one we found the stomach contained about 1.5 kg only. I would like to declare that there 
are big opportunities to have crocodile farms; it is a very profitable business on the one hand and 
would solve your problem on the other. 
Regarding the fisheries, to gain profit from the lake we have to spend more money to invest 
resources, and the cooperatives should play an effective role to get higher fish catch.
We should pay more attention to the fishers themselves because they are working under severe 
conditions and are the people who get the least benefit. If we improve their situation, probably 
they will stop using illegal nets to catch small fish. 
Eng. Mahmoud Hasseb Hussein, Executive director of Lake Nasser GAFRD
The cooperatives should be the main partners in the studies. The reason for the recorded decline 
in fish catch in 2000 (8000 t as total catch) was the obligatory fish price and the debits to the two 
marketing companies (Misr Aswan Company and the Egyptian Fish Marketing Company).
Until 2001, there was complete cooperation between the HDLDA and GAFRD. The current situation 
is due to administration reasons not technical reasons. Since 2010, the security authorities have 
been busy with the current situation of the country, and less effort was given to enforcing laws in 
Lake Nasser. Changing the HDLDA from a service authority to an economic one affects our effort 
because we have to pay for using facilities (boats, workshops, etc.). The current situation is bad, and 
the species composition has changed from 50%–60% O. niloticus to only 25%, and Tilapia zillii and 
O. galilaeus predominate. We prepared the study and the plans were submitted. 
Dr. Hussein Amar Adam, Lecturer, Aswan University
Enforce laws and regular inspection of the fisheries. Have an effective closed season, with the 
modification that the fishers stay at their camps to guard their fishing area and are permitted to 
catch the salted fish only. No ice will be provided. Scientific organizations should have research on 
a regular basis, such as NIOF, FMC, etc. Support GAFRD with human resources (more employees). 
Completely stop using cars for transportation, giving about 6 months as a transition period 
because we do not know the right weight, species composition and size composition.
Mr. Morad Zaki Agaypi, Ex-director of HDLDA
I have been working in Lake Nasser for more than 30 years. There is a very important thing missing, 
which is the cooperation between fishers, cooperatives, GAFRD and the HDLDA to enforce laws.
Eng. Mohamed Saad El Daein Abbas, Director of Coop and River Nile GAFRD
I am grateful for the chance to meet my friends who I have not seen for a while. The target is to 
help the fishers. The cooperation between different authorities is a must; there are minor problems. 
The fishers in the River Nile are slightly neglected and are working under hard circumstances. There 
is a very crucial problem, which is that fish from sewage is in the market now. At the beginning 
it was sold in Draw and Kom Ombo, but it has reached Aswan. We made notes and spoke to the 
Aswan Governor. This fish is causing different diseases.
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Dr. Ashley Halls
First of all, I think and all of you agree that this was very useful. That shows that there is agreement 
and not a conflict.
My feeling is that there is a desire to work together with harmony, and there is a role for everyone 
to participate in organizing the work. There is no one responsible for management, so we have to 
react as administrators and scientists to move forward.
I think we have reached the point that fisheries are not in a healthy state. The fisheries of Lake 
Nasser have been studied for decades.
We have to look to science as a way to find ideal solutions for our problems.
There is no control over the fisheries with certain regulations, so we have to look once more to 
changing these circumstances.
We have to rethink the fisheries, because species composition has changed and the situation too.
Do we have to apply a closed season, mesh size regulation, size to fish, etc.?
Generally, it is very important to apply a regulation when we decide on it, and we should have a 
penalty for not carrying it out.
We have to raise awareness and the reasons for doing that.
We have to think how we can help the fishers and stop them from catching small-sized fish, 
because if the traders keep buying the small fish from them that means they are encouraging them 
to destroy the fish stock.
We cannot determine all the solutions today or in a week or in a month.
We have to cooperate and have discussions to put a plan in place that everyone can participate in. 
By everyone I mean the fisher, trader, processor and cooperative—and we especially would like to 
know the fisher’s point of view. We have to know why the fisher sells fish to a smuggler. 
We have to sit down together to reach a plan for co-management for the lake. If you agree, I am 
going to explain that to the donors. Each time we set a plan in place, all the stakeholders should 
attend and participate in each step. Whenever we make a plan, we should follow up with the 
regulations to carry it out in order to reach the ideal situation.
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Stakeholder meeting participants
No. Name Occupation
1 Tawfik Abdel Fatah Chair of El Takamol Coop
2 Gamal Abdo Hassoun Director of Nubian Coop 
3 Esam Abd El Nasser Hassen Member of Nubian Coop
4 Dahab Ali Galal Chair of Aswan Sons Coop
5 Nabil Mansour Tayah Member of Aswan Sons Coop 
6 Kamal Ebrahim Bekheit Vice chair of Mother Coop
7 Abd El Moaety Dein Mersal Chair of Care Coop for fishers
8 Esmail Hagage Abd El Alla Chair of independent syndicate for fishers
9 Badawe Mohran El Sayed Fisher, trader and processor
10 Waeel Abd El Hamaed Trader of salted fish
11 Mahmoud Hasseb Hussein Executive director of GAFRD
12 Mohamed Saad El Daein Abbas Director of Coop and River Nile GAFRD
13 Osama Mohamed Kamel Director of Misr Aswan sector 
14 Ashraf Mohamed Bagdade Egyptian Fish Marketing Company
15 Osman Saad Hussein Microfinance Care
16 Morad Zaki Agaypi Ex-director of HDLDA
17 Dr. Hussein Amar Adam Lecturer, Aswan University 
18 Amro Mohamed El Tarry Environment researcher, EEAA
19 Dr. Mohamed Ezzat Crocodiles unit, EEAA
20 Basma Mostafa Abbas Environment awareness, EEAA
21 Dr. Ashley Halls Consultant
22 Olfat Anwar WorldFish
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ANNEX 4. FISH DISPOSAL PATHWAY DIAGRAM 
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ANNEX 5. SWOT ANALYSIS 
Strengths Weaknesses
• Institutions and administrative procedures already 
exist to support management. 
• Management authority and other key stakeholders 
acknowledge that fishery resource status is poor 
and in decline, and that strengthened and improved 
management is required.
• Management authority recognizes need to consult 
key stakeholders when making decisions, and 
appears receptive to advice and offers of support.
• Processing facilities and supporting services 
already exist to respond to improvements in output 
(landings).
• There is strong interest in value-added products and 
exports among processors.
• Current management authority (GAFRD) has limited 
capacity (knowledge, experience and resources) to 
manage resources effectively and sustainably.
• There are no clear management objectives, nor 
management plan to achieve stated objectives.
• There is uncertainty over resource status. There 
has been no formal stock assessment for 17 years. 
However, available data and most recent observations 
and anecdotes suggest that overcapacity exists and 
resources are overexploited. 
• There is no monitoring of indicators of resource status 
or management performance (fishing effort, catch 
rates, fishing mortality, target and limit reference 
points, etc.).
• Some fishers report having little trust, confidence and 
respect for the current management authority.
• GAFRD has insufficient resources to effectively 
enforce control measures.
• There is poor understanding of fish disposal 
pathways, hindering effective monitoring program 
design.
• There is unfamiliarity with the latest stock assessment 
models (e.g. biomass dynamics models). 
• Catch monitoring programs restricted only to harbors 
are likely to underestimate true landings.
Opportunities Threats
• GAFRD acknowledges its limited capacity to manage 
and has expressed interest in (project) support 
and collaboration to improve its capacity and 
management performance. 
• Stakeholders acknowledge the poor status of the 
fishery and have agreed to form a co-management 
organization, to meet regularly, and to formulate and 
implement a new management plan to strengthen 
management.
• Capacity and willingness exists locally and nationally 
(former FMC employees and existing NIOF staff) to 
potentially provide stock assessment and technical 
advice to GAFRD to improve management.
• Issues and constraints to improve management are 
now well understood and outline plans to remedy 
the situation have been discussed and provisionally 
approved by key stakeholders during this mission.
• Improved stock assessment approaches and models 
exist (e.g. extended biomass dynamics models to 
account for effort and environmental variation) to 
provide better management advice. Preliminary 
applications of these methods have been made.
• A length-based stock assessment could be 
undertaken quickly and cheaply to help validate 
the preliminary stock assessment results generated 
by this mission and generate other indicators and 
reference points to guide future management efforts.
• There is existing donor engagement and support.
• There is potential for development of national and 
export markets for wild-caught fish from Lake Nasser.
• There is potential for crocodile farming.
• Increasing use of (illegal) small-mesh nets, 
destructive fishing practices and unlicensed boats 
are causing overcapacity and overexploitation of 
the fish resources, potentially threatening resource 
sustainability and dependent livelihoods and food 
security. 
• There has been recent undocumented ad hoc 
manipulation and adjustment of catch statistics to 
demonstrate management performance, giving the 
wrong impression of the status of management and 
the health of fish stocks.
• No apparent limits are set on the number of boats 
that can be licensed, allowing capacity (boat 
numbers) to grow.
• Increasing capture efficiency (catchability) is arising 
from more widespread use of outboard engines. 
• There are limited alternative livelihood opportunities 
for existing fishers.
• Cheap cultured fish is available from the delta and 
elsewhere.
• There may be rivalry between stakeholders who 
could potentially collaborate effectively to improve 
management performance.
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